J. Hyan v. Rosslyn Hummer
825 F.3d 1043
9th Cir.2016Background
- J.P. Hyan obtained a $7.5 million legal-malpractice settlement against his former firm Rutter Hobbes & Davidoff (RHD) in state court but has not been paid.
- RHD carried primary and excess malpractice insurance (Liberty and ERSIC); competing insurance claims and coverage disputes followed.
- Hyan sued RHD, insurer Liberty, and two former RHD attorneys (Hummer and Peterson) in federal court alleging interference with payment of the settlement.
- Defendant Rosslyn Beth Hummer moved to strike Hyan’s claims under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute; the district court granted Hummer’s motion and dismissed her from the suit.
- The district court’s order also dismissed Liberty in the same order; at the time of appeal RHD remained as a defendant in the district court.
- Hyan appealed the anti‑SLAPP dismissal; the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s grant of an anti‑SLAPP motion is a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 | Hyan: the anti‑SLAPP grant is final and immediately appealable (California law treats it as final). | Hummer: the order dismissed fewer than all parties; Rule 54(b) makes it non‑final in federal court. | Not final — appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Whether Erie requires applying California’s rule making anti‑SLAPP orders immediately appealable | Hyan: California statute and precedent make such orders appealable and time‑sensitive. | Hummer: Erie mandates federal procedural law; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) governs finality. | Erie/federal procedure controls; California special appealability does not render the order final. |
| Whether the collateral order doctrine permits immediate appeal of the grant of an anti‑SLAPP motion | Hyan: the order should be immediately appealable (important, separate issue). | Hummer: grant is reviewable after final judgment; collateral order doctrine requirements unmet. | Collateral order doctrine does not apply; grant is reviewable on appeal from final judgment. |
| Whether prior Ninth Circuit anti‑SLAPP appeals show this grant was appealable | Hyan: prior Ninth Circuit review of anti‑SLAPP grants supports appealability. | Hummer: prior cases involved orders that dismissed all defendants (final orders). | Prior cases are distinguishable; those orders were final, so they don’t change this result. |
Key Cases Cited
- Greensprings Baptist Christian Fellowship Trust v. Cilley, 629 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2010) (federal appellate jurisdiction limited to final decisions)
- Clausen v. M/V NEW CARISSA, 339 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003) (Erie: federal courts apply state substantive law and federal procedural law)
- Manufactured Home Cmties., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 655 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ninth Circuit review of anti‑SLAPP order where entire case was dismissed)
- DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2013) (denial of anti‑SLAPP motion reviewable under collateral order doctrine)
- Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (requiring litigants often to wait until final judgment to vindicate important rights)
- Am. Ironworkers & Erectors, Inc. v. North Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2001) (interlocutory orders merge into final judgment and may be appealed then)
- SEC v. Capital Consultants LLC, 453 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing collateral order doctrine criteria)