J.H. v. Hamilton City School Dist.
2013 Ohio 2967
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- J.H., a severely handicapped 14-year-old student, was injured at Garfield Middle School on Oct. 10, 2010 while employee Brenda Asher was pushing his wheelchair; plaintiffs allege Asher continued to push despite resistance and J.H. suffered a broken tibia.
- Plaintiffs (Katherine and Dexter Harris on behalf of J.H.) sued the Hamilton City School District Board of Education and Asher for negligence and for failing to train/have proper policies, asserting respondeat superior liability against the Board.
- The Board and Asher admitted employment and scope-of-employment but moved for judgment on the pleadings based on statutory governmental immunity (R.C. Chapter 2744 and related provisions).
- Trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants, concluding plaintiffs failed to plead facts bringing the case within any exception to political-subdivision or employee immunity.
- Plaintiffs appealed, arguing their negligence pleadings were sufficient to survive a Civ.R. 12(C) motion and that exceptions under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) or (B)(5) applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the school board is immune under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) or an exception under R.C. 2744.02(B) applies | Harris: Board not immune because exceptions apply (proprietary function or statutory waiver under R.C. 2743.02) | Board: School operations (including student transport) are governmental functions; no pleaded facts invoke R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions | Board immune; plaintiffs failed to plead an applicable R.C. 2744.02(B) exception, so judgment for Board affirmed |
| Whether R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) imposes liability on the Board | Harris: R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) waives immunity and permits suit | Board: R.C. 2743.02 applies to the State not political subdivisions; does not impose liability on school districts | R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) inapplicable to political subdivisions; cannot be used to abrogate Board immunity |
| Whether Asher (employee) is immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) or whether exceptions (scope, malice/bad faith/wanton/reckless, statutory) are pleaded | Harris: negligent allegations suffice to overcome employee immunity; need not plead wanton/reckless/malice | Asher: pleadings allege negligence only; no allegations she acted manifestly outside scope, maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly; no statute expressly imposes liability | Asher immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); negligence allegations insufficient to plead malice/bad faith/wanton/recklessness; judgment affirmed |
| Proper standard on Civ.R. 12(C) motion | Harris: motion premature without discovery; complaint should be construed in plaintiffs' favor | Defendants: pleadings controlled; court can decide immunity questions as a matter of law on the record | Court applied de novo review; Civ.R. 12(C) limited to pleadings and inferences for nonmoving party; plaintiffs could prove no set of facts to overcome immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161 (Ohio 1973) (standard and timing for Civ.R. 12(C) judgment on the pleadings)
- Carter v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24 (Ohio 1998) (three-tiered analysis for political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744)
- State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565 (Ohio 1996) (standard for when judgment on the pleadings is appropriate)
- Thompson v. McNeil, 53 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1990) (definition of "reckless" conduct exceeding negligence)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 2012) (definition of "wanton" conduct)