J.H. v. G.H., 63 Cal.App.5th 633

Background:

G.H. and J.H. divorced after a long history of domestic and sexual abuse alleged by G.H.; two children, L.H. (born ~2007) and B.H., were present during some incidents and a juvenile dependency case followed.
The juvenile court awarded G.H. sole physical custody and supervised visitation to J.H.; the Agency recommended continued supervised visitation because the children expressed discomfort.
G.H. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) for herself and the children; a temporary DVRO issued for G.H. but the court did not check the children as protected persons on the form.
After a multi-day contested hearing (evidence included G.H.’s testimony describing physical and sexual abuse, J.H.’s partial admissions and rehabilitation efforts, and Agency reports), the trial court granted a two-year DVRO protecting G.H., denied including the children as protected parties, and precluded L.H. (age 12) from testifying at the hearing.
G.H. appealed, arguing (1) the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and abused discretion in excluding the children from the DVRO, (2) erred in excluding L.H.’s live testimony, and (3) abused discretion in awarding only a two-year (rather than five-year) DVRO.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (G.H.)	Defendant's Argument (J.H.)	Held
Whether children may be added as protected parties under Fam. Code §6340 and what standard applies	Section 6340 should be read to allow inclusion on a good-cause basis (as in §6320); court improperly required a showing of likely future abuse	Section 6340 requires that court consider whether failure to order would jeopardize children’s safety (a jeopardy/necessity-type requirement)	Court held §6340 permits the same discretion as §6320 (good cause/totality-of-circumstances), and consideration of whether failure to order may jeopardize safety is required but not a necessary precondition; trial court did not misapply the law and reasonably excluded the children given the totality of the evidence.
Exclusion of L.H.’s live testimony at the contested hearing (Evidence Code §352; Fam. Code §217)	L.H. is a percipient witness to major incidents in 2016 and 2018 and her live testimony was necessary; court lacked basis to preclude under §217 absent stipulation or stated good cause	Testimony would be cumulative, unduly prolong the hearing, risk prejudice and harm to child–father relationship; other evidence (G.H.’s testimony, Agency reports, witnesses) already covered the events	Court did not abuse discretion. Exclusion was proper under Evidence Code §352 as cumulative; the §352 analysis supplied the required good-cause basis under §217.
Length of DVRO (two years vs requested five)	Five-year DVRO justified given history of serious abuse; court improperly relied on a non-existent “three-year standard” and gave undue weight to passage of time	Court reasonably weighed totality of circumstances (including 17 months since last abuse), and used its discretion to set two years	Court considered totality of circumstances and statutory defaults; two-year order was within discretion and not an abuse.

Key Cases Cited

Nakamura v. Parker, 156 Cal.App.4th 327 (2007) (DVPA provisions construed to afford courts discretionary, liberally-exercised authority to issue orders).
In re R.T., 3 Cal.5th 622 (2017) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; start with plain meaning).
Rodriguez v. Menjivar, 243 Cal.App.4th 816 (2015) (de novo review of whether trial court applied correct standard for DVRO inclusion).
Perez v. Torres-Hernandez, 1 Cal.App.5th 389 (2016) (trial court must consider abuse toward children when modifying/renewing DVROs).
People v. Brady, 50 Cal.4th 547 (2010) (trial court must exclude unduly cumulative evidence under Evidence Code §352).
People v. Waidla, 22 Cal.4th 690 (2000) (standard for abuse of discretion review in evidentiary exclusions).
Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 557 (1970) (appellate review considers whether trial court’s decision was within bounds of reason).