594 S.W.3d 871
Ark.2020Background
- John and Megan Bolinder, unmarried, litigated custody in Benton County; the court appointed Dr. Martin T. Faitak to perform psychological examinations and later ordered monthly joint mediation sessions with him to improve communication and trust.
- The appointment order required joint counseling and split costs; it did not authorize individual diagnoses or brokering settlements.
- John and Bolinder attended four joint sessions (March–May 2014); during these sessions Faitak allegedly diagnosed John with narcissistic personality disorder and disclosed that diagnosis to Bolinder.
- John sued Faitak in Washington County on multiple theories (medical negligence, breach of fiduciary duty/contract/confidentiality, conspiracy, defamation, invasion of privacy, etc.).
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for Faitak based on quasi-judicial immunity; the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed; the Arkansas Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court held that Faitak’s alleged acts (individual diagnosis, disclosure, and brokering/communication with counsel) exceeded the scope of the appointment order and thus are not protected by quasi-judicial immunity; it reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (John) | Defendant's Argument (Faitak) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether quasi-judicial immunity bars John's claims | Immunity does not apply because Faitak acted outside the court order (diagnosed John individually, disclosed diagnosis, conspired with opposing counsel) | Immunity applies because actions arose from and were performed under the court's appointment/order | Held: No immunity. Alleged acts exceeded the scope of the appointment order, so quasi-judicial immunity does not bar the claims |
| Whether individual diagnosis and disclosure were within the appointment’s scope | Such diagnosis and public disclosure were not authorized and breached confidentiality | Sessions were court-ordered mediation; disclosures occurred in that context and relate to court-ordered counseling | Held: Diagnosis and disclosure were outside the appointment’s scope; thus not immune |
| Whether alleged conspiracy/brokering settlement is protected by immunity | The alleged ex parte communications and brokering fall outside the court’s authorized role and represent biased, nonjudicial conduct | Any communications arose from the court-ordered sessions and therefore are within the scope and integral to the process | Held: Alleged conspiracy/brokering exceeded the appointment’s scope; not protected |
| Whether factual disputes defeat summary judgment on immunity | Disputed facts should be viewed in plaintiff’s favor; several admitted facts show acts outside the order | Contends the legal scope determination should be for the court and that many acts were within the order | Held: On the record and construing facts for John, admitted conduct placed key acts outside the order; immunity resolved against Faitak as a matter of law and summary judgment was improper for immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Stern, 338 Ark. 332 (1999) (court-appointed physicians entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when serving an integral judicial function and acting within scope of court order)
- Martin v. Smith, 576 S.W.3d 32 (Ark. 2019) (reaffirming immunity applies only to actors who serve an integral function and act within the scope of a court’s order)
- Repking v. Lokey, 377 S.W.3d 211 (Ark. 2010) (summary-judgment review of immunity is de novo)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (absolute judicial immunity is narrow; is "strong medicine")
- Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993) (being part of a judicial function does not automatically confer immunity)
- Kahle v. Leonard, 577 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard for deciding qualified/quasi-judicial immunity issues on assumed facts at summary judgment)