457 F.Supp.3d 1365
Ct. Int'l Trade2020Background
- Section 232 investigation (Commerce, 2017–2018) concluded steel imports threaten national security; President issued Proclamation 9705 (Mar. 2018) imposing 25% ad valorem tariffs on steel (Canada/Mexico exempt).
- Proclamation 9980 (Jan. 24, 2020) extended the 25% tariff to certain steel derivatives (including steel nails), effective for entries on or after Feb. 8, 2020; some countries were exempted.
- Plaintiffs J. Conrad LTD and Metropolitan Staple Corp. are importers/distributors of steel nails; they sued and moved for TROs/preliminary injunctions to enjoin collection of Proclamation 9980 duties and to suspend liquidation of affected entries.
- Complaints alleged: APA violations by Commerce, unlawful timing under Section 232, Fifth Amendment due‑process and equal‑protection claims; Plaintiffs sought deposit collection relief and suspension of liquidation.
- The court heard consolidated telephonic argument, relied primarily on affidavits and documentary submissions, and exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
- The panel denied preliminary injunctions and found TROs moot because Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm— dispositive under Winter v. NRDC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper PI standard (sliding scale vs. strict Winter test) | Sliding‑scale: a strong showing on some factors can offset weaker showing on others; "fair chance" of success may suffice. | Winter requires plaintiffs to show each element (including likelihood of irreparable harm); no relaxation. | Court follows Winter: plaintiff must show likelihood of irreparable harm; sliding scale cannot dilute that element. |
| Irreparable harm from payment of 25% cash deposits | Payment will severely impair cash flow/profitability; small businesses cannot absorb or fully pass on costs—economic harm is immediate and irreparable. | Economic loss can be remedied by money judgment (refund with interest); Plaintiffs failed to quantify insolvency risk or that money damages would be inadequate. | Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of irreparable harm from cash deposits; conclusory affidavits and unquantified records insufficient. |
| Irreparable harm from liquidation of entries | Liquidation during litigation would be final and prevent recovery, causing irreparable harm. | Court has equitable power to order reliquidation/refunds if plaintiffs prevail; defendants agree liquidation would not bar refund. | Liquidation is not likely irreparable here—Shinyei relief and the Court's remedial powers make money relief an adequate remedy. |
| Procedural / competitive injuries (lost comment opportunity; competitors with consent injunctions) | Denial of notice/comment and contemporaneous injunctions for competitors cause procedural and competitive irreparable harm. | Procedural injury alone does not establish irreparable harm; plaintiffs point to economic injury (duties) which is compensable; competitive harm raised too late and without evidence. | Procedural due‑process claim does not, by itself, show irreparable harm; competitive‑harm theory raised only in reply and unsupported—cannot justify injunction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (U.S. 2008) (preliminary injunction requires likelihood of irreparable harm; Ninth Circuit "possibility" standard rejected)
- Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1974) (economic losses that can be remedied by damages are generally not irreparable)
- Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussed irreparable harm in trade cases and consequences of liquidation)
- Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (CIT's broad remedial powers allow reliquidation/refund; liquidation not necessarily fatal to relief)
- Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reserved whether Winter permits relaxation of merits element under sliding‑scale test)
- Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (U.S. 1997) (reiterated the exacting standard for preliminary injunctions)