916 F.3d 1161
9th Cir.2019Background
- J.B. and P.B., elderly taxpayers, were selected for a 2011 IRS National Research Program (NRP) audit; J.B. is a court‑appointed capital defense attorney.
- The IRS mailed an introductory audit letter that included Publication 1 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights) warning generally that the IRS "may" contact third parties.
- Two years later the IRS issued summonses to the California Supreme Court seeking J.B.’s billing statements and invoices; the couple learned of the third‑party contact only after service on their daughter and petitioned to quash.
- The district court granted the petition to quash the 2011 summons, holding Publication 1 alone did not satisfy I.R.C. § 7602(c)(1)’s requirement of “reasonable notice in advance.”
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether § 7602(c)(1) requires more than a general publication and affirmed the quash, applying a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances, reasonableness standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “reasonable notice in advance” under I.R.C. § 7602(c)(1) | §7602(c)(1) requires notice calculated to apprise and give a meaningful opportunity to respond | The statutory phrase permits a categorical/general notice (Publication 1) in all cases | Court: "reasonable notice" means notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties and afford a meaningful opportunity to resolve issues before third‑party contacts are made |
| Whether Publication 1 mailed here satisfied §7602(c)(1) | Publication 1 suffices as advance notice | Publication 1 sufficed and requiring more specific notice would render §7602(c)(2) superfluous | Court: Publication 1 alone was not reasonable here; under the facts (two‑year gap, sensitive employer contact, ongoing litigation, privileged records requested) IRS failed to provide adequate advance notice |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) (notice must be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise interested parties)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (foundational standard for adequacy of notice)
- Powell v. United States, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (four‑part test for enforcing IRS administrative summons)
- Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002) (notice standards in administrative contexts)
- Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) (notice adequacy to affected parties)
- A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945) (construe statutory exceptions narrowly in favor of protected interests)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (avoid statutory interpretations that render other provisions superfluous)
- Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (account for unique recipient circumstances when assessing notice)
- Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (notice sufficiency may require additional steps based on recipient information)
