J.B., Etc. v. Florida Department of Children and Families
170 So. 3d 780
Fla.2015Background
- Mother J.B. (was 17 at child's birth) had child D.L. removed in 2011; dependency adjudication and reunification plan followed; DCF later filed for termination of parental rights (TPR).
- At the 2013 TPR adjudicatory hearing, mother's trial counsel appeared fatigued, filed a last-minute continuance motion, and conceded preparedness issues during opening; numerous witnesses (DCF caseworkers, psychologist, therapist, foster parents, GAL) testified for termination.
- The trial court terminated J.B.’s parental rights based on failure to comply with the case plan, abandonment/neglect, and risk of harm; J.B. appealed raising ten ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for the first time on appeal.
- The First District applied the Strickland standard and affirmed, but certified two questions of great public importance about (1) whether Strickland applies to TPR ineffective-assistance claims and (2) whether a post-TPR procedure exists for raising non-record-based ineffective-assistance claims.
- The Florida Supreme Court held that the state-constitutional right to counsel in TPR includes the right to effective assistance, adopted a TPR-specific standard for ineffectiveness, and prescribed an interim expedited procedure for post-TPR ineffective-assistance motions; it nonetheless affirmed the termination on the record in this case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (J.B.) | Defendant's Argument (DCF) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Strickland criminal standard apply to ineffective-assistance claims in TPR proceedings? | Strickland is inappropriate; prefer a "fundamental fairness" standard (e.g., Geist) without Strickland's heavy presumption. | Adopt Strickland; it is familiar and used by many jurisdictions in TPR cases. | No. Court declined to simply transplant Strickland; adopted a TPR-specific standard that preserves a strong presumption of reasonable assistance but requires a showing that counsel’s specific errors cumulatively prejudiced the outcome (butter-than-Strickland prejudice). |
| Is there a procedural vehicle after TPR to raise ineffective-assistance claims not evident on the record? | Need an effective post-TPR procedure to vindicate the right to effective counsel. | DCF emphasized finality and promptness but did not oppose a tailored, expedited remedy. | Yes. Court established an interim expedited process: pro se motion in circuit court within 20 days of TPR judgment, trial court disposition within 25 days (or deemed denied), tolling rendition for appeal; appellate review consolidated with any TPR appeal. Court directed rulemaking for permanent process. |
| What is the substantive standard for ineffective assistance in TPR cases? | (J.B.) Argued counsel was ineffective on multiple discrete record-based grounds; sought relief. | DCF argued parent must show prejudice and that the record does not demonstrate obvious ineffectiveness. | The Court articulated a TPR-specific two-part test: (1) identify specific acts/omissions showing deficient exercise of reasonable, professional judgment (presumption counsel acted reasonably), and (2) show that cumulatively the deficiencies prejudiced the outcome such that, but for them, termination would not have occurred (a showing beyond Strickland’s undermined-confidence test). |
| Application to J.B.’s claims — was relief warranted? | J.B. listed ten discrete errors (late continuance, counsel exhaustion, evidentiary mistakes, witness/list issues, failure to move for dismissal, etc.) and alleged prejudice. | DCF and courts found claims conclusory, not established on record, and lacking demonstration of outcome-determinative prejudice. | Denied. The Court agreed the appellate record did not demonstrate meritorious ineffective-assistance claims and affirmed termination. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance standard in criminal cases)
- In re D.B., 385 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1980) (Florida recognizes state-constitutional right to counsel in TPR proceedings)
- Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (federal due process does not always require appointed counsel in TPR)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (parental rights are fundamental; state must provide fundamentally fair procedures)
- U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (narrow circumstances where prejudice may be presumed)
- Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (federal habeas collateral review can unduly delay permanency)
- J.B. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam., 158 So.3d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (district court opinion that certified the questions)
- E.T. v. State, 930 So.2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (recognizing need to treat ineffectiveness in TPR differently and certifying questions)
- In re M.R., 565 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (appointed counsel must provide meaningful assistance in TPR proceedings)