J. Albert Lynch v. Town of Pelham
167 N.H. 14
| N.H. | 2014Background
- In 1985 Lynch (as Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust) sold an 18-acre parcel to the Town of Pelham subject to multiple deed restrictions (e.g., buildings must be Colonial with pitched roofs; plant a 30-foot row of trees; maintain a stone wall). Lynch as Trustee retained no other nearby land at the time of conveyance.
- The Town developed the parcel as the Village Green and later approved construction of a new fire station; Trustee claimed portions violated the deed restrictions (flat roof, concrete walls) and demanded compliance.
- Trustee filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; Town moved to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing the covenants are appurtenant and Lynch (Trustee) owned no benefited land.
- Trial court dismissed, applying Shaff v. Leyland to construe ambiguous covenants as appurtenant and concluding Trustee lacked a legitimate interest to enforce even if covenants were in gross; denied Trustee’s motion to add an abutting landowner.
- Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed: it concluded the covenants were in gross based on deed language and circumstances, adopted Restatement (Third) §8.1’s legitimate-interest approach for enforcement of covenants in gross, and held Trustee had a legitimate interest to enforce.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the deed restrictions are covenants appurtenant or in gross | Lynch: deed covenants are in gross — deed omits a benefited parcel and Trustee owned no other land, and other deed provisions expressly created appurtenant servitudes when intended | Town: New Hampshire favors construing ambiguous covenants as appurtenant; no explicit “in gross” language, so covenants are appurtenant | Covenants are in gross (court relied on deed context and Restatement §4.5 principles) |
| Whether a holder of an in gross covenant must own benefited land to enforce it | Lynch: standing exists because servitudes in gross can be enforced by their holder | Town: traditional common-law rule requires ownership of benefited land; Trustee lacks standing | Adopted Restatement (Third) §8.1: ownership of land is not a prerequisite; holder may enforce if they show a legitimate interest |
| What constitutes a "legitimate interest" to enforce a covenant in gross | Lynch: aesthetic/public-purpose covenants are non-monetary, difficult to monetize, and enforcement advances the servitude’s purpose | Town: Trustee has no economic harm or reciprocal development scheme and thus lacks legitimate interest | A legitimate interest need not be financial; advancing the servitude’s purpose (e.g., public/aesthetic conservation-like benefits) suffices; Trustee demonstrated such an interest |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying amendment to add an abutting landowner | Lynch: adding an abutter was appropriate to preserve enforcement and was not futile | Town: deed contains no third-party enforcement right; adding a party would not cure standing issue | Court did not decide on amendment; on remand trial court must address merits and remedy; primary ruling reverses dismissal for lack of standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Shaff v. Leyland, 154 N.H. 495 (2006) (discusses classification of covenants as appurtenant or in gross and standing to enforce)
- Appletree Mall Assocs. v. Ravenna Inv. Assocs., 162 N.H. 344 (2011) (deed interpretation is a question of law; court looks to parties’ intent and circumstances)
- Joslin v. Pine River Dev. Corp., 116 N.H. 814 (1976) (focus on effectuating manifest intent rather than strict formalism in covenant interpretation)
- Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694 (2004) (contrast between appurtenant easement and easement in gross)
- Tanguay v. Biathrow, 156 N.H. 313 (2007) (easement in gross can exist without explicit “in gross” language given clear intent)
- Town of Newington v. State of N.H., 162 N.H. 745 (2011) (reiterates need to decide servitude cases on individual facts)