Ivey v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark
129 Nev. 154
Nev.2013Background
- This is an original writ petition arising from post-divorce-decree proceedings between Phillip Ivey, Jr. and Luciaetta Ivey.
- Luciaetta sought to reopen discovery and moved to disqualify Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion; Judge Togliatti denied the disqualification and Gonzalez presided over the motion to reopen discovery.
- Luciaetta petitioned for mandamus/prohibition arguing due process and Nevada-law disqualification; the petition was denied.
- Campaign contributions to Judge Gonzalez from Phillip and related divorce participants occurred after the divorce decree, totaling about $10,000 in cash and $3,543.54 in kind, with mixed proportional significance to the campaign.
- Luciaetta argued Caperton v. Massey Coal Co. compelled recusal; the court concluded contributions did not reach Caperton’s exceptional level.
- The court held that Nevada law and the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct did not require disqualification, and the writ petition was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did due process require disqualification due to campaign contributions? | Ivey argues Caperton requires recusal. | Gonzalez argues contributions do not create excessive bias risk. | No due-process violation; no recusal required. |
| Did Nevada law require disqualification under NRS 1.230 and NCJC? | Ivey contends contributions create impartiality concerns under Nevada law. | Gonzalez asserts contributions were not substantial or timelike enough to require disqualification. | Nevada law did not require disqualification. |
| Was the writ petition moot given the district court proceedings had concluded? | Ivey argues ongoing live controversy exists that could void improper rulings. | Gonzalez contends the matter is moot. | Not moot; controversy remains. |
| Should Caperton guide Nevada disqualification standards post-Caperton? | Ivey invokes Caperton to argue higher risk of bias. | Gonzalez and court treat Caperton as an exceptional standard not controlling Nevada rules without broader changes. | Caperton does not compel per se rules; contributions here were not exceptional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (U.S. 2009) (due-process recusal when campaign spending creates high risk of bias; exceptional case)
- In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (U.S. 1955) (due process requires fair tribunal without implied bias)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (U.S. 1975) (due-process evaluation of bias involves objective risk, not required proof of actual bias)
- Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment v. Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 640 (Nev. 2000) (campaign contributions within statutory limits generally not grounds for disqualification)
- In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784 (Nev. 1988) (campaign contributions do not automatically require disqualification; broad public-interest considerations)
- Millen v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1245 (Nev. 2006) (judge has duty to sit unless disqualification required by canon, statute, or rule)