Ivana Vidovic Mlinar v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 186 So. 3d 997

Ivana Mlinar shipped two valuable oil paintings via UPS; when the package reached its New York destination it was empty and the duct tape was sliced.
UPS reportedly sold the recovered paintings to Cargo Largo (a lost-goods contractor), which auctioned them; a third party buyer (Anderson) later listed and sold the paintings online, using Mlinar’s name to promote authenticity.
Mlinar sued UPS, Pak Mail, Cargo Largo, and Anderson asserting conversion, profiting by criminal activity (Fla. Stat. §817.02), unauthorized publication of name or likeness (Fla. Stat. §540.08), and FDUTPA claims.
The trial court dismissed the state-law claims as preempted by the Carmack Amendment; the Fourth District affirmed, applying a “separate conduct” preemption test and certified conflict with the Fifth District’s decision in Braid Sales (which applied a “separate harm” test).
The Florida Supreme Court accepted review to resolve the conflict between the two district-court approaches to Carmack Amendment preemption.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Carmack Amendment preempts Mlinar’s state-law claims (conversion, criminal-activity statute, unauthorized use of name, FDUTPA)	Mlinar: claims allege intentional, larcenous misconduct and misuse of her identity separate from ordinary loss or damage to shipped goods	UPS: claims stem from the loss of the package and thus fall squarely within Carmack’s uniform liability scheme and are preempted	The Court: Carmack preempts state claims generally, but does not preempt claims that allege conduct or harm "separate and distinct" from the loss or damage to the goods; Mlinar’s claims survive preemption allegation-stage review
Which test governs Carmack preemption in Florida: "separate harm" vs "separate conduct"	Mlinar: courts should allow non-preempted claims that show independent harms beyond property loss	UPS: favors a broad preemption tied to the carrier’s delivery-related conduct to preserve uniformity	The Court: adopts a combined principle — do not choose exclusively; a claim survives preemption if it alleges conduct or harm separate and distinct from the loss/damage to the goods

King Ocean Cent. Am., S.A. v. Precision Cutting Servs., Inc., 717 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1998) (Carmack Amendment governs carrier liability for interstate loss or damage to goods)
Braid Sales & Marketing, Inc. v. R & L Carriers, Inc., 838 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (applies a separate-harm test to find Carmack non-preemptive for certain post-shipment contractual promises)
Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir. 1997) (addresses limits of Carmack preemption and separate-harm analysis)
Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997) (permits state-law claims for harms distinct from property damage, focusing on carrier conduct producing independent harms)
Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (discusses tests for distinguishing preempted carriage-related claims)
Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2002) (interprets Carmack savings clause and preemption boundaries)
White v. Mayflower Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2008) (criticizes a purely harm-focused test and emphasizes conduct in preemption analysis)
Se. Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936) (observes Carmack’s broad coverage of damages arising from carrier failures)
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) (background on the need for uniform federal rules on carrier liability)