Ivan William Sanchez v. State, 04-16-00360-CR

Ivan William Sanchez was convicted by a jury of three counts of indecency with a child and one count of aggravated sexual assault of his step-daughter; sentences of 50 years (aggravated assault) and three concurrent 20-year terms (indecency) were imposed.
This was Sanchez’s second trial on these charges following a prior reversal and remand.
On appeal Sanchez raised two primary complaints: (1) the prosecutor asked an allegedly improper commitment question during voir dire; and (2) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after defense counsel admitted he had incorrectly told Sanchez the jury could impose community supervision (probation).
The voir dire question asked whether jurors thought children in a "broken home" were easier to abuse; defense argued the question was an improper commitment question and case-specific.
At punishment, defense presented witnesses and Sanchez testified in favor of probation; after trial the judge stated Sanchez was not probation-eligible due to a prior conviction and defense counsel conceded he had been mistaken about eligibility and asked for a mistrial.
The trial court overruled the voir dire objection and denied the mistrial; the appeals court reviewed for abuse of discretion and applied Strickland for the ineffective-assistance claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the prosecutor’s voir dire question was an improper commitment question	Sanchez: question committed jurors to a verdict based on specific facts (improper)	State: question probed jurors’ general views about vulnerability of children and was not case-specific or a commitment	Court: Not a commitment question; allowed as proper inquiry into general juror views (issue overruled)
Whether denial of mistrial was error after counsel admitted he erroneously advised Sanchez that jury could impose community supervision (ineffective assistance)	Sanchez: counsel’s mistaken advice was deficient and prejudiced punishment-phase presentation and plea decisions, warranting mistrial	State: deficient advice conceded but any prejudice is speculative because jury imposed terms (50 and 20 years) that made probation impossible; no reasonable probability of different outcome	Court: First Strickland prong met (advice was erroneous), but second prong not met—prejudice speculative given lengthy sentences; mistrial denial affirmed

Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial court has broad discretion over voir dire and commitment-question framework)
Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (two-part test for improper commitment questions)
Wingo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (general belief questions not commitment questions)
Vrba v. State, 151 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004) (questions about general signs or risk factors are proper voir dire)
Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion standard for denying mistrial)
Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (counsel’s incorrect advice can satisfy Strickland’s first prong)
Ex parte Cash, 178 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (prejudice from counsel’s probation-related failures is speculative where jury imposed a long prison term)
Lopez v. State, 261 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008) (standard of review and considerations for mistrial/ineffective assistance claims)