Italian Colors Restaurant v. Xavier Becerra
878 F.3d 1165
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Five California businesses (Italian Colors Restaurant; Laurelwood Cleaners; Family Graphics; Stonecrest Gas & Wash; Leon’s Transmission) seek to impose credit-card surcharges but have refrained out of fear of violating Cal. Civ. Code § 1748.1, which bans surcharges but permits cash discounts.
- Plaintiffs state they would use a single-sticker pricing scheme (post one advertised price, then add a surcharge for credit-card users) and say surcharges better communicate credit-card processing costs and more effectively influence consumer behavior than equivalent cash discounts.
- California enacted § 1748.1 in 1985 after a now-lapsed federal surcharge ban; the statute forbids imposing a surcharge on credit-card users and allows discounts for non-card payments; willful violators face treble damages and attorney’s fees.
- Plaintiffs sued the state Attorney General seeking a declaration that § 1748.1 violates the First Amendment (content- and speaker-based restriction on commercial speech) and is unconstitutionally vague; the district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed standing, whether the statute regulates speech, and whether § 1748.1 survives Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny; the court affirmed that the statute, as applied to these plaintiffs, violates the First Amendment and limited relief to the plaintiffs and their specific single-sticker surcharge practice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (pre-enforcement) | Plaintiffs have concrete plans to post single-sticker surcharges and have reasonably self-censored due to credible threat of enforcement | State points to sparse enforcement history and no direct threats to plaintiffs | Plaintiffs have standing: credible threat, concrete intent, and self-censorship suffice (as First Amendment inquiry favors standing) |
| Does § 1748.1 regulate speech or conduct? | § 1748.1 regulates merchants’ price communications (how prices are framed) | § 1748.1 regulates economic conduct (charging different prices) | Regulates commercial speech (Expressions III controls) |
| Central Hudson — Lawful and non-misleading? | Surcharges would be truthful and non-misleading as plaintiffs intend to disclose them | State contends some surcharges can be deceptive (bait-and-switch) | Plaintiffs’ proposed surcharges are lawful and non-misleading (record shows intent to disclose) |
| Central Hudson — Substantial interest, direct advancement, and tailoring | State’s interest in preventing deception is insufficiently supported; statute blocks truthful causal price information and has many exemptions; less restrictive alternatives exist | § 1748.1 advances consumer protection and market operation as stated in legislative history | § 1748.1, as applied to these plaintiffs, does not directly advance the interest and is more extensive than necessary; violates First Amendment (as-applied) |
Key Cases Cited
- Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (statute regulating surcharge display regulates price communication and implicates the First Amendment)
- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate scrutiny framework for commercial speech)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requirements for injury, causation, redressability)
- Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (government must show harms are real and that regulation materially alleviates them)
- Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (heightened scrutiny for regulations that suppress truthful, non-misleading information)
- 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (government’s burden is heavy in restricting truthful commercial speech)
- LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (standing in pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges)
- Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003) (chilling effect and hold-your-tongue approach to facial/pre-enforcement First Amendment suits)
