Israel Gonzalez v. McKinney Dodge Inc., Dodge City of McKinney and Gus Rodriguez
05-14-00482-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 1, 2015Background
- Gonzalez sued McKinney Dodge, Inc. and Gus Rodriguez alleging retaliatory termination for inquiring about workers’ compensation after an on-the-job assault.
- Appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment; the trial court granted the traditional motion and denied the no-evidence motion.
- Appellees asserted multiple grounds: statute of limitations, voluntary quit/released for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, and failure to plead a claim against Rodriguez.
- Appellees submitted affidavits stating Gonzalez’s employment ended "on or about October 15, 2010;" Gonzalez filed suit October 17, 2012.
- The trial court excluded some of Gonzalez’s late and unauthenticated evidence but considered others; the court’s order did not specify which ground(s) supported summary judgment.
- The court of appeals affirmed, finding summary judgment proper on the voluntary-quit/release and Rodriguez-not-employer grounds, but reversed as to limitations (affidavits lacked date certainty).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on statute-of-limitations grounds | Gonzalez argued appellees failed to prove accrual date; his suit was timely | Appellees argued employment ended Oct. 15, 2010, so suit filed after two-year limitations | Court: Affidavits saying “on or about Oct. 15, 2010” lacked required date certainty; summary judgment on limitations not sustained |
| Whether summary judgment was proper on retaliatory-discharge (voluntary quit/release) ground | Gonzalez argued he was released for retaliatory reasons and offered Walker affidavit denying legitimate reason for release | Appellees produced evidence Gonzalez voluntarily quit and no plans existed to retaliate | Court: Evidence of voluntary quit was uncontroverted; summary judgment proper on this ground |
| Whether Rodriguez was a proper defendant | Gonzalez sued Rodriguez individually | Appellees argued Rodriguez was not Gonzalez’s employer under Workers’ Compensation Act | Court: Rodriguez was not the employer; failure-to-state-a-cause ground supports summary judgment as to Rodriguez |
| Admissibility/timeliness of Gonzalez’s evidence and discovery complaints | Gonzalez contended the trial court abused discretion in excluding late/unauthenticated evidence and erred on discovery rulings | Appellees argued the late documents were unauthenticated/hearsay and properly excluded; deposition/order were within court discretion | Court: Trial court acted within its discretion excluding unauthenticated/hearsay evidence and its discovery orders; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Kyle v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (nonmovant evidence and inferences taken as true)
- Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1970) (appellant must negate all possible grounds when trial court’s order is nonspecific)
- Vaughn v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., 792 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1990) ("on or about" means approximate date; specificity requirement for affidavits)
- Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1996) (accrual of wrongful discharge claim upon notice of termination)
- Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1996) (timeliness rules for opposing summary-judgment evidence)
- Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2007) (burden on nonmovant after movant establishes limitations)
- Medford v. Medford, 68 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002) (unauthenticated documents not considered on summary judgment)
- Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp., 74 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002) (same)
- Jenkins v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 16 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000) (Workers’ Compensation Act claim cannot be brought against non-employer)
- Terry v. Southern Floral Co., 927 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996) (retaliatory discharge statute inapplicable if employee quit or release was for legitimate reasons)