Ismael Lozada v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
702 F. App'x 904
11th Cir.2017Background
- Hobby Lobby managers received coworker reports that employee Ismael Lozada had threatened to "shoot up" the store and kill himself if he was not made full-time; managers collected written statements from three employees and forwarded them to corporate loss-prevention.
- Corporate loss-prevention told the store manager (Licari) to remove Lozada and contact law enforcement; Licari met with sheriff’s deputies and provided a written summary referencing the Baker Act.
- Deputy Wilson subsequently interviewed Lozada at his residence/hotel and civilly committed him under Florida’s Baker Act for about 36 hours; Lozada was later released and faced no criminal charges.
- Lozada sued Hobby Lobby in state court asserting defamation and false arrest (malicious prosecution claim was dismissed voluntarily); the case was removed to federal district court and Hobby Lobby moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Hobby Lobby on (1) defamation claims because some statements were not attributable to the employer and others were protected by qualified privilege, and (2) false arrest because Hobby Lobby did not instigate law enforcement’s detention. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dendariarina’s statement to coworkers is attributable to Hobby Lobby (scope of employment) | Dendariarina’s comments about Lozada’s threats should be imputed to Hobby Lobby | Statement was made after work, as gossip, and not to further employer’s interests, so outside scope of employment | Not attributable: employee acted for personal motives, not within scope of employment; summary judgment for Hobby Lobby affirmed |
| Whether statements made by Hobby Lobby employees (to managers and police) are protected by qualified privilege or overcome by express malice/recklessness | Licari’s and managers’ statements contained misrepresentations and were reckless or malicious enough to overcome privilege | Statements to police and to persons with corresponding duties are presumptively qualifiedly privileged and there is no evidence of express malice or recklessness | Privileged: statements were qualifiedly privileged and no express malice or recklessness shown; summary judgment for Hobby Lobby affirmed |
| Whether reckless misrepresentations to police (per Valladares) can defeat qualified privilege in defamation context | Valladares supports that reckless misrepresentations to law enforcement overcome privilege here | Valladares addressed negligent reports and malicious-prosecution context, not the express-malice requirement for defamation; and Licari’s alleged misstatements were not reckless | Valladares inapposite; even if relevant, Licari’s statements were not reckless as a matter of law |
| Whether Hobby Lobby instigated Lozada’s Baker Act detention (false arrest) | Corporate instructions to contact law enforcement and to exclude Lozada, and references to Baker Act, show Hobby Lobby procured detention | Hobby Lobby employees reported concerns in good faith and did not ask officers to arrest or detain; deputies independently decided to detain after evaluating Lozada | No instigation: reporting to police in good faith is not instigation; summary judgment for Hobby Lobby affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rowell v. Holt, 850 So.2d 474 (Fla. 2003) (defamation is an intentional tort)
- Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1985) (qualified privilege framework for communications made in good faith to protect an interest)
- Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1992) (distinguishing absolute and qualified privilege; express malice defeats qualified privilege)
- Valladares v. Bank of Am. Corp., 197 So.3d 1 (Fla. 2016) (reckless misidentification to police can constitute culpable conduct; discussed in context of negligent reports and severe harm)
- Pokorny v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Largo, 382 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1980) (private citizen not liable for arrest caused by report unless he instigated the arrest)
- Del Aguila (Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Del Aguila), 417 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1982) (employer liability for employee torts requires authorization or action within scope of employment)