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260 A.3d 372
Vt.
2021
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Background

  • Island Industrial built a private road (Island Circle) in 2004 and in 2006 executed an agreement with the Town of Grand Isle that the Town would have no responsibility for the road unless the agreement was amended in writing.
  • In 2014 Island Industrial petitioned the Town to accept Island Circle as a public road; in September 2016 the selectboard unanimously moved to accept the road "after a two‑year period" to test pavement performance and directed the town attorney to amend the 2006 agreement.
  • Following the 2016 motion Island Industrial executed an irrevocable offer of dedication and prepared deeds, which the Town stored; Island Industrial then paved the road and incurred costs in reliance on the 2016 action.
  • In July 2018 the selectboard, after executive sessions (one of which Island Industrial did not receive notice for), rescinded the 2016 motion and provided reasons including cost, limited benefit, and safety concerns.
  • Island Industrial sued under V.R.C.P. 75 seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Town to accept Island Circle, alleging (inter alia) that the rescission exceeded the selectboard’s authority, was arbitrary and capricious, violated due process, and breached a promissory‑estoppel promise to accept.
  • The trial court granted the Town’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) the 2016 motion did not create a ministerial duty to accept the road, (2) rescission was not an arbitrary abuse of power, and (3) promissory estoppel could not, or had not been pleaded to, convert discretion into a ministerial duty. Island Industrial appealed.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the trial court abused discretion by deciding Town's Rule 12(c) motion instead of the earlier summary‑judgment motion or converting 12(c) to summary judgment Island Ind.: court should have ruled on the summary‑judgment motion given the parties' investment in discovery; conversion required if the court considered materials outside the pleadings Town: 12(c) timely; court may disregard extrinsic materials and decide the Rule 12(c) motion on pleadings only Court did not abuse discretion; 12(c) timely and the court limited its ruling to the pleadings (no conversion required)
Whether the 2016 selectboard motion created a ministerial duty to accept Island Circle (mandamus) Island Ind.: 2016 vote to accept (with two‑year delay) plus irrevocable offer of dedication vested rights and imposed a duty on the Town Town: 2016 motion was conditional/non‑binding; acceptance requires unequivocal town intent and affirmative act; no vested rights Held: 2016 motion was not an unequivocal acceptance; no ministerial duty arose; mandamus unavailable on that basis
Whether the 2018 rescission was an arbitrary abuse of power amounting to virtual refusal to act Island Ind.: rescission was arbitrary — only one reason was given at the meeting, then different reasons in follow‑up letter, and Plaintiff relied on the earlier promise Town: rescission exercised lawful discretion; reasons were not facially invalid; no practical refusal to perform a clear duty Held: rescission did not amount to an arbitrary abuse of power because no clear legal duty existed to compel acceptance
Whether promissory estoppel entitles Island Industrial to mandamus (i.e., convert discretion into a duty) Island Ind.: selectboard’s 2016 promise was relied upon (expenditures, offer of dedication); injustice requires enforcement Town: promissory estoppel cannot convert discretionary municipal acts into ministerial duties; damages/reliance relief is available Held: even assuming promissory estoppel could impose a duty, Plaintiff failed the third element — other adequate remedies (reliance damages) exist, so mandamus is not available

Key Cases Cited

  • Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 211 Vt. 10, 219 A.3d 326 (Vt. 2019) (standard of review: de novo for judgment on the pleadings)
  • Messier v. Bushman, 208 Vt. 261, 197 A.3d 882 (Vt. 2018) (Rule 12(c) inquiry: whether movant entitled to judgment as a matter of law on pleadings)
  • Thayer v. Herdt, 155 Vt. 448, 586 A.2d 1122 (Vt. 1990) (treat well‑pleaded allegations as true on Rule 12(c))
  • Wool v. Office of Professional Regulation, 236 A.3d 1250 (Vt. 2020) (definition and elements of mandamus)
  • Ahern v. Mackey, 181 Vt. 599, 925 A.2d 1011 (Vt. 2007) (mandamus extended to arbitrary abuse of power amounting to virtual refusal to act)
  • Hayes v. Mountain View Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 207 Vt. 293, 188 A.3d 678 (Vt. 2018) (elements of dedication and acceptance of private road as public)
  • Smith v. Town of Derby, 170 Vt. 553, 742 A.2d 757 (Vt. 1999) (town resolution and maintenance facts may not establish unequivocal acceptance)
  • Gardner v. Town of Ludlow, 135 Vt. 87, 369 A.2d 1382 (Vt. 1977) (highways cannot be forced on a town without acceptance)
  • Inman v. Pallito, 195 Vt. 218, 87 A.3d 449 (Vt. 2013) (distinguishing error in discretionary decisions from arbitrary abuse warranting mandamus)
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Case Details

Case Name: Island Industrial, LLC v. Town of Grand Isle
Court Name: Supreme Court of Vermont
Date Published: Jul 2, 2021
Citations: 260 A.3d 372; 2021 VT 49; 2020-273
Docket Number: 2020-273
Court Abbreviation: Vt.
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    Island Industrial, LLC v. Town of Grand Isle, 260 A.3d 372