Isby v. Brown
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8310
7th Cir.2017Background
- Aaron E. Isby has been held in department-wide administrative segregation (SCU) since October 2006 (over ten years) after prior violent convictions and prison incidents; he remains confined ~23 hours/day with limited out-of-cell time, programs, and privileges.
- Conditions complained of: small cell (~80 sq ft), 24-hour low-wattage lighting, limited exercise and showers, restricted phone access and programming, infrequent laundry and clothing issuance, and allegedly poor food/water quality; he reports anger, dehumanization, and some physical complaints but no diagnosed serious mental illness.
- IDOC conducted monthly (30-day) and optional 90-day reviews; the standard output for Isby’s reviews was a boilerplate two-line statement continuing segregation; defendants point to availability of step-down programs (ACT, Moral Reconation, New Castle) that require inmate cooperation.
- District court: granted summary judgment to defendants on the due-process claim (30-day informal reviews suffice) and, after a bench trial, entered judgment for defendants on the Eighth Amendment claim (conditions, in total, not an extreme deprivation; refusal to cooperate with programs relevant).
- Procedural wrinkle: Isby had three PLRA “strikes” and failed to disclose them when seeking IFP; defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on that basis shortly before oral argument. The Seventh Circuit exercised discretion to hear the appeal (denying dismissal) but ordered Isby to pay outstanding fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Isby’s prolonged confinement and SCU conditions violate the Eighth Amendment | Conditions taken together (lighting, exercise limits, food, showers, mattress, isolation, duration) create an excessive risk/deprivation of basic human needs | Conditions do not amount to an extreme deprivation; no serious physical/psychological harm shown; alternatives/programs available and Isby refused them | Affirmed for defendants — objective element not met; conditions (even in combination) not Eighth Amendment violation under existing precedent |
| Whether the 30-day review process violated procedural due process (Fourteenth Amendment) | Reviews are perfunctory/boilerplate and may be pretextual given long duration; meaningful periodic review required | Monthly reviews occurred; Hewitt permits informal, nonadversarial periodic review and IDOC procedures suffice | Reversed district court; genuine issues of fact exist whether reviews were meaningful or pretextual — remand for further proceedings |
| Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on due-process claim | Deliberately meaningless reviews deny due process; officials should not be shielded | No clearly established law showing these specific review procedures were unlawful | Summary judgment on qualified immunity denied at this stage — factual disputes preclude immunity determination |
| Whether appeal should be dismissed for failure to disclose PLRA “three strikes” and pay fees | Isby sought discretion to reach merits; appointed counsel offered to pay fees | Failure to disclose strikes was deceptive; dismissal is proper unless fees paid or imminent danger alleged | Court exercised discretion to hear merits, accepted counsel’s payment, denied dismissal but warned this is exceptional |
Key Cases Cited
- Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (Eighth Circuit 1981) (standards for conditions-of-confinement Eighth Amendment analysis)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (objective and subjective components for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference)
- Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (periodic review requirement for administrative segregation; informal, nonadversarial process may suffice)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor balancing test for what process is due)
- Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (prolonged administrative segregation may violate Eighth Amendment depending on duration/nature)
- Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (feasible alternatives and conditions-of-confinement analysis)
- Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hewitt interpreted to allow informal periodic review but guard against pretext)
- Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (failure to disclose three-strikes status and seeking IFP can warrant dismissal)
- Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2012) (periodic-review must be meaningful; rubber-stamping violates due process)
- Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2017) (very long-term administrative segregation requires meaningful reviews; preordained outcomes may violate due process)