Irshad Learning Center v. County of DuPage
804 F. Supp. 2d 697
N.D. Ill.2011Background
- Irshad Learning Center seeks a conditional use permit to use unincorporated DuPage County property for religious worship and education; the County denied the request.
- Plaintiff filed suit asserting violations of the U.S. Constitution, Illinois Constitution, and RLUIPA; Defendants include DuPage County and numerous ZBA and County Board officials.
- DuPage County zoning history includes a Balkwill School on the same site with a prior conditional use and parking arrangements similar to what Irshad seeks.
- Zoning procedure in DuPage involves ZBA, CDC, and County Board; the ZBA issues findings, which the CDC may remand to clarify findings before County Board review.
- Plaintiff proposed to operate with conditions similar to Balkwill’s, including parking and hours; multiple hearings followed with varying votes and remands.
- Alavi Foundation linkage and external political activity were raised during proceedings and cited in subsequent remand discussions; final County Board vote denied the permit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| timeliness of challenge to county decision | 5/12012.1 90-day review governs; 3-103 35-day ARL does not control. | ARL 35-day limit applies; action untimely. | Plaintiff timely; 90-day de novo review controls. |
| immunity of individual defendants | Individual defendants violated rights; accountability possible. | Individual ZBA/Board members entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. | Absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to ZBA and County Board members; claims against individuals dismissed. |
| RLUIPA equal-terms claim | Denied equal terms vs. Balkwill School; procedures and treatment differ for religious uses. | Equal terms requirement not shown; Balkwill use is analogous. | RLUIPA equal-terms claim survives at pleading stage; plausible equal treatment issue shown. |
| RLUIPA substantial burden claim | Delays, conditions, and discouraging conduct imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise. | Burden not proven; standard applied is deferential. | Substantial burden claim allowed to proceed; evidence suggests arbitrary and delaying actions. |
| free exercise and related claims | County actions targeted religion; burden on religious exercise. | No clear evidence of targeting; standard uncertain. | Plaintiff states a federal free exercise claim (Count III) and Illinois free exercise claim; survives at this stage. |
| free speech/assembly claims | Denial of permit impeded religious speech/assembly. | Plaintiff retains other avenues; no state-level deprival shown. | Counts IV and XI dismissed as they fail to state a claim given available venues for assembly/speech. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lukumi Babalu Aye, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 F.3d 520 (1993) (free exercise strict scrutiny framework for neutral laws targeting religion)
- World Outreach Conference Ctr v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009) (substantial burden and scope of review in RFRA/RLUIPA context)
- Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (substantial burden analysis; need to show significant effect on religious exercise)
- Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983) (liquor-licensing immunity framework; not binding, but cited for immunity context)
- Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2006) (three-factor test for quasi-judicial immunity in zoning)
- Millineum Maintenance Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Lake, 384 Ill.App.3d 638 (2d Dist. 2008) (removal of certain zoning decisions from ARL; de novo review implications)
- Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 397 Ill.App.3d 1003 (2d Dist. 2009) (interpretation of 5-12012.1 de novo review in Illinois)
- Sts. Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005) (substantial burden discussion in religious land-use context)
- Long Branch v. Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, 510 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2008) (free exercise standard in zoning challenges (cited for standard agreement))