131 F.4th 1153
10th Cir.2025Background
- The case concerns the validity of "corner-crossing"—stepping from one public land parcel to another at the shared corner of adjacent private and public lands in a checkerboard pattern—on land in Wyoming.
- Iron Bar Holdings, LLC owns a ranch consisting of private parcels interspersed with federally owned land, typical of the railroad "checkerboard" grants of the 19th century.
- Four hunters crossed from public to public land using the corners, never touching the surface of Iron Bar's land but briefly passing through its airspace.
- Iron Bar pursued criminal and civil claims for trespass, asserting an airspace right to exclude others, and sought $9 million for alleged damages; the hunters were acquitted of criminal trespass and moved for summary judgment in the civil case.
- The district court granted the hunters' motion, holding that corner-crossing without touching or damaging private property is not trespass; Iron Bar appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is corner-crossing through airspace trespass? | Iron Bar: Owns airspace, right to exclude all entry, even non-physical. | Hunters: No surface contact; only crossed from public to public land. | Court: Under Wyoming law, such airspace crossing is civil trespass. |
| Does federal law preempt state property rights? | State law recognizes trespass in airspace; UIA limited in effect. | UIA and federal law override state law when used to bar public access. | Court: UIA and precedent preempt state law—access cannot be barred. |
| Is there a taking requiring compensation? | Iron Bar: Limited right to exclude is a taking; compensation owed. | Hunters: No compensation since owner never had right to exclude access to public land. | Court: Abatement of a federal nuisance is not a taking; no compensation owed. |
| Does the UIA permit private owners to bar access? | Iron Bar: UIA does not abrogate its private property rights. | Hunters: UIA prohibits inclosure or obstruction of public land access. | Court: UIA prohibits physical or legal barriers that prevent access. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (affirmed implied public license to access public lands where not enclosed)
- Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (UIA authorizes abatement of barriers enclosing public land, including fences)
- McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (UIA supports right of free transit over public land)
- Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (UIA does not imply a public road easement; distinguishes between nuisance and implied-right-of-way)
- U.S. ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988) (UIA prohibits practical inclosure of public land; Camfield controls over Leo Sheep in this context)