Irma Woodward v. City of Tucson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17896
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- May 21, 2014: Tucson PD dispatched to report that former tenants (including Amber Watts) were inside a vacant, officially-evicted apartment; caller declined to identify herself on scene.
- Officers Meyer and Soeder arrived, found the security door unlocked/open, entered the apartment without a warrant after announcing themselves, and cleared the living area; they heard a radio and approached a closed bedroom door.
- Upon opening the bedroom door, officers saw Michael Duncklee holding a ~2-foot broken hockey stick; he allegedly charged/growled and advanced with the stick raised in a small, cluttered space.
- Officers fired; Duncklee was killed; Watts (shot in the leg) survived. Officers sought a search warrant afterward.
- Plaintiff (Duncklee’s mother) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful entry and excessive force; district court denied qualified immunity and granted partial summary judgment finding the warrantless entry unconstitutional, relying on a provocation theory.
- Ninth Circuit reversed: held Duncklee (and Plaintiff) lacked Fourth Amendment privacy standing for the apartment because Watts had been formally evicted; also held Mendez abrogated the provocation theory, and that shooting under these facts was not clearly established unlawful—thus qualified immunity applies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge warrantless entry of apartment | Duncklee (via Plaintiff) was an overnight guest of tenant Watts and thus had a reasonable expectation of privacy | Watts had been evicted and was a trespasser; Duncklee therefore had no privacy interest | No standing: Watts was evicted; Duncklee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment |
| Lawfulness of warrantless entry | Entry into a dwelling without warrant violated Fourth Amendment; no exigency or valid consent | Entry was lawful as to Duncklee only if he had privacy rights; because he lacked those rights, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred | Reversed district court: no Fourth Amendment violation re: apartment entry as to Duncklee; qualified immunity applies |
| Application of provocation theory to excessive-force claim | Unreasonable entry (drawing guns/entering) provoked the lethal encounter, making later shooting excessive per Alexander/Billington | Provocation theory was abrogated by Supreme Court in Mendez; one must assess each seizure separately | District court erred to rely on provocation theory (Mendez controls); cannot conflate entry with later use of force |
| Qualified immunity for use of deadly force against Duncklee | Drawing guns and entering created the unconstitutional situation; thus officers not immune for subsequent shooting | Even assuming constitutional violation, it was not clearly established that shooting a charging man with a raised weapon in a confined space was unlawful | Defendants entitled to qualified immunity for shooting: precedent permitted deadly force where suspect threatens officers with a weapon and does not heed warnings |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (recognizing interlocutory appealability of qualified immunity denials)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two-part inquiry)
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (provocation theory abrogated; analyze each seizure/search separately)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force permissible when suspect threatens officer with a weapon and warning given if feasible)
- Blanford v. Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110 (officers entitled to qualified immunity for shooting suspect with raised sword who ignored commands and made threatening noises)
- Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528 (overnight guest has reasonable expectation of privacy)
- Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178 (Fourth Amendment rights are personal; standing limited to one whose person/house/papers/effects were searched)
- Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate, 25 F.3d 784 (squatter’s guest has no greater right than squatter; no expectation of privacy for squatters)
- United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731 (trespassers lack Fourth Amendment protections)
- Frunz v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141 (cases involving warrantless searches where occupants had property rights)
- Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (provocation theory applied historically; later abrogated)
- Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (applied provocation theory pre-Mendez)