Irma Lemus and Manuel Lemus v. John Rene Aguilar, Johnny B. Wells, Laura Ashley Wells, and Johnny Montoya Garza, 04-14-00609-CV

Background

Property: family home at 106 Cameo — title originally in Elvira Aguilar; she and partner Johnny Montoya Garza raised grandchildren who lived there.
March 11, 2005 handwritten instrument by Elvira and Garza (called a “will”) recited that the house "belongs" to them and "be evenly owned" by grandchildren; kept in the house and treated by family as conveying ownership.
January 7, 2009 deed conveying 106 Cameo to Elvira’s daughter Irma Lemus and her husband (the “Lemus Deed”) was later recorded; plaintiffs alleged Elvira lacked capacity when it was executed.
Elvira was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and treated at Normandy Terrace nursing home with contemporaneous medical/nursing records showing confusion, disorientation, and dependency in late 2008–January 2009.
Procedural posture: plaintiffs (Garza and grandchildren) sought declaratory judgment that the 2005 instrument was a valid deed conveying title and asked the court to cancel the 2009 Lemus deed for lack of capacity; court ruled for plaintiffs and awarded attorneys’ fees.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the March 11, 2005 handwritten “will” operates as a deed conveying title to the grandchildren	The instrument manifests present donative intent, identifies grantees and control rights, was kept and acted on by family — satisfies requisites of a deed/gift	It is merely a nonprobate “will” or ambiguous, lacking formal words of grant, acknowledgement, recording, or manual delivery	Court upheld trial finding that the 2005 instrument functioned as a deed (present gift) and conveyed title to grandchildren
Whether Elvira had capacity to execute the January 7, 2009 Lemus deed	Plaintiffs: contemporaneous medical and nursing records + family testimony show advanced Alzheimer’s; therefore deed is void for lack of mental capacity	Defendants: claim Elvira recognized family that day; notary/attorney testimony implies understanding; deed formalities were followed	Court affirmed cancellation of the 2009 deed — Elvira lacked requisite capacity when it was executed
Whether Lemuses are entitled to reimbursement for improvements and taxes under Tex. Prop. Code §22.021 (good-faith improvements)	Lemuses claim they made permanent, valuable improvements and paid taxes and therefore are entitled to recovery	Plaintiffs: Lemuses had notice of adverse claims and acted after suit was filed; they failed to plead §22.021 elements and to prove increased value; equity bars recovery (fraudulent acquisition)	Court found Lemuses acted in bad faith / lacked entitlement: improvements after suit, inadequate proof of increased value, and use/occupation offset — claim denied
Authenticity of Elvira’s signature on the 2005 instrument and effect of Rule 93 (verified denial)	Lemuses challenge authenticity of signature (argue forgery/inconsistency with exemplars)	Plaintiffs: defendants failed to file a verified denial under Tex. R. Civ. P. 93 so the instrument’s execution is deemed proved; offered Garza’s testimony and other exemplars	Court accepted trial court’s implied finding of authenticity: absence of a verified denial and unreliable exemplars meant signature was treated as proved

Key Cases Cited

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for reviewing legal and factual sufficiency and weight/credibility of evidence)
Soper v. Medford, 258 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1953) (labeling an instrument a "will" does not control if it conveys a present interest)
Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1967) (consideration of surrounding circumstances for donative intent)
Plumb v. Stuessy, 617 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1981) (trespass to try title principles and methods to prove title)
Caddell v. Caddell, 131 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) (deed voidable where grantor lacked capacity; deed canceled for imposition on an enfeebled mind)
Dickerson v. Keller, 521 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 1975) (relevance of intent and right of control in determining present conveyance vs. testamentary disposition)