IOWA SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Appellee, v. ATTORNEY DOE NO. 819, Appellant
894 N.W.2d 1
Iowa2016Background
- A former client alleged Attorney Doe induced investments (2004–2006) without disclosing conflicts; Doe submitted a detailed written denial and documents to the Disciplinary Board before formal charges.
- The Board filed formal disciplinary charges (Sept. 30, 2015); Doe accepted service but did not file a written answer within the 20-day period under Iowa Ct. R. 36.7.
- Doe’s counsel explained delay was due to Doe’s serious medical issues and that the FBI had seized relevant documents; Doe and counsel provided medical letters and an affidavit describing limitations and participation in practice.
- The Grievance Commission invoked Iowa Ct. R. 36.7 sua sponte, found no timely answer or written extension request, deemed the complaint allegations admitted, and limited the hearing to sanctions.
- Doe sought reconsideration, filed an answer after the commission’s ruling, and appealed; the Iowa Supreme Court granted interlocutory review.
- The Supreme Court concluded rule 36.7 consequences are mandatory and self-executing but held the commission abused its discretion by not granting a short extension given the Board’s conduct, ambiguity in practice, and preference to decide disciplinary matters on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 36.7’s consequence (allegations deemed admitted) is mandatory or directory | Rule 36.7 describes a consequence and must be mandatory to ensure prompt responses | Doe argued equities (health, FBI seizure, Board practice) mean strict enforcement is unfair | Court: Rule 36.7 is mandatory (describes an automatic consequence) |
| Whether the Commission may deem allegations admitted sua sponte or required a Board motion | Board implied it need not move; enforcement can be raised by commission | Doe argued the Board’s informal course of conduct and lack of a motion made outcome unfair | Court: No Board motion required; rule is self-executing and respondent must move to avoid consequences |
| Whether the Board can waive enforcement of Rule 36.7 by informal agreement or practice | Board argued practice of granting extensions means it may effectively allow late answers | Doe argued Board’s conduct and specific interactions created reasonable expectation of accommodation | Court: Board cannot unilaterally waive mandatory rule; only the commission can grant relief on motion for good cause |
| Whether the Commission abused discretion by refusing a belated good-cause motion | Board argued no colorable good-cause (delay, lack of timely effort to retrieve FBI records) | Doe argued medical incapacity, document seizure, ongoing cooperation, and ambiguous practice warranted a short extension to litigate merits | Court: Commission abused discretion here; should have granted a brief extension and allowed merits hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Dep’t of Transp., 260 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 1977) (distinguishes mandatory vs. directory statutory time requirements)
- Allied Gas & Chem. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1983) (failure to respond to requests deemed admitted; court may allow withdrawal)
- In re Brown, 939 So. 2d 1241 (La. 2006) (liberal construction of deemed-admitted rule to permit merits resolution)
- In re Disciplinary Action Against Larson, 324 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1982) (court may excuse late answer but may refuse when conduct suggests procedural delay)
- In re Weston, 442 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1982) (refusal to grant additional opportunity where respondent failed to appear or cooperate)
- In re Disciplinary Action Against Ulanowski, 834 N.W.2d 697 (Minn. 2013) (director’s motion led to deemed admissions)