Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Richard Scott Rhinehart
2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 13
Iowa2013Background
- Two-count Iowa attorney-ddisciplinary complaint against Rhinehart for alleged extrinsic fraud in his own dissolution case and a fee dispute with the Merrigans.
- District court found Rhinehart committed extrinsic fraud in dissolution; issue preclusion given to district ruling; court of appeals affirmed; Supreme Court granted review.
- Disciplinary Board sought suspension; Board and Rhinehart stipulated record; Commission recommended sixty-day suspension.
- De novo review considered: Rhinehart’s conduct in dissolution proceeding violated some rules only when acting as advocate; others not applicable to him as a party.
- Board found Rhinehart violated rule 32:8.4(c) and 32:8.4(d) from extrinsic fraud; Rhinehart violated two of three fee-related rules (32:1.5(a) and 32:1.15(e)); court rejected 32:8.4(c) in fee dispute.
- The Court suspended Rhinehart’s license for sixty days, with no reinstatement during suspension; costs assessed to Rhinehart.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of rules 32:3.3 and 32:3.4 to Rhinehart as a party | Rhinehart violated rules as advocate. | Rules apply only to advocates; Rhinehart not advocating in dissolution. | Rules 32:3.3 and 32:3.4 do not apply to Rhinehart. |
| Whether issue preclusion properly precludes relitigation of extrinsic fraud | District ruling of extrinsic fraud binding for disciplinary review. | Fraud ruling not material to property division; preclusion improper. | Extrinsic fraud finding has preclusive effect in disciplinary proceeding. |
| Which rules were violated in the Merrigan fee dispute | Rhinehart violated 32:1.5(a), 32:1.15(e), and 32:8.4(c) (as argued). | Only two of the three fee-related rules proven; 32:8.4(c) not proven. | Rhinehart violated 32:1.5(a) and 32:1.15(e); not 32:8.4(c) in fee dispute. |
| Appropriate sanction for the misconduct | Sixty-day suspension warranted per precedent and aggravating factors. | Sanction should be more severe than sixty days due to misconduct. | Sixty-day license suspension with no reinstatement during period. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012) (de novo review; sanctions factors; issue preclusion framework described)
- Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Iversen, 723 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 2006) (offensive issue preclusion considerations in disciplinary context)
- Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012) (finality principles for issue preclusion in disciplinary matters; disposition of issues used for preclusion)
- Wright v. Reis / Stowers cont’d, Не (Iowa 2010) (discussion of finality and preclusion in interim rulings (cited for preclusion rationale))