Inwood Forest Community Improvement Association v. Toan Van Nguyen, 14-14-00825-CV

Background

Inwood Forest Community Improvement Association (Association) sued to invalidate a petition to modify deed restrictions for Section 12 of a subdivision; multiple homeowners (Homeowners) moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).
Hearing on the TCPA motions was held September 15, 2014; the trial judge orally said, "I am going to grant the motions to dismiss," but declined to sign written orders and instructed the parties to confer over the next 30 days.
The TCPA requires a trial court to rule on a motion to dismiss within 30 days of the hearing; failure to do so results in the motion being denied by operation of law (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 27.005(a), 27.008(a)).
The Association filed an interlocutory appeal on October 16, 2014 (30 days after the hearing). The trial court later signed written orders granting most Homeowners’ motions more than 30 days after the hearing.
The court of appeals concluded the judge’s oral statements were not a present rendition of judgment but an intention to rule later; therefore the motions were denied by operation of law and the belated written orders were ineffective.
Because the Association elected to dismiss its appeal if the motions were overruled by operation of law, the court granted the Association’s motion and dismissed the appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court’s oral statement at the hearing constituted a ruling under the TCPA	Association: The judge’s oral announcement granting the motions was an effective ruling; written order not required	Homeowners: The judge granted the motions at the hearing (but declined to sign then)	Held: Oral statements were ineffective to constitute a present ruling; they reflected intent to decide later, so no timely ruling was rendered
Whether failure to sign a written order within 30 days causes denial by operation of law under the TCPA	Association: Because an effective ruling was made, TCPA timing does not bar the grant	Homeowners: The 30-day statute is mandatory but the judge ruled within the hearing	Held: TCPA’s 30-day rule is mandatory; absent a timely ruling the motions are denied by operation of law
Validity of written orders signed after the 30-day period	Association: Post-deadline signed orders are effective	Homeowners: Post-deadline orders cannot revive an overruled motion	Held: Orders signed after the 30-day deadline were of no effect; trial court lacked authority to grant after motions were overruled by operation of law
Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory grant/denial and disposition of this appeal	Association: Questions whether appellate jurisdiction exists; requests dismissal if motions were denied by operation of law	Homeowners: Maintain there was an effective grant, so appeal is interlocutory and jurisdictional problems mean no appeal	Held: Because motions were denied by operation of law and the Association moved to dismiss its appeal on that basis, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal (court did not decide broader jurisdictional questions)

Key Cases Cited

Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates LLC, 407 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) (TCPA 30-day deadline is mandatory)
Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (trial court has no discretion to extend TCPA timing)
State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015) (judgment is rendered when officially announced or by written memorandum; oral rendition must be a present act)
Ex parte Olivares, 662 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. 1983) (formal entry of a signed judgment is ministerial)
Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1970) (rendition of judgment definition)
S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1995) (words must indicate present intent to render judgment orally)
Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. 1976) (statement of intent to grant in future is not present rendition)
Walker v. Harrison, 597 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1980) (when time limit affects court's jurisdiction, order must be in writing and signed)