202 Conn.App. 582
Conn. App. Ct.2021Background:
- Fairfield Commons received a special permit and coastal site plan approval in April 2006 to develop a retail (later medical office) building on a 3.6-acre parcel; a third-party appeal was finally dismissed April 8, 2009.
- Fairfield zoning regulations in effect in 2009 contained a two-year completion requirement for special permits (with limited extensions); in February 2011 the commission deleted that two-year language and cross-referenced the statutes.
- Fairfield Commons asked the town in February/March 2011 for confirmation that the approvals remained effective through April 8, 2014; the town confirmed in writing; the legislature amended the site-plan statute (§ 8-3(m)) in May 2011 to extend certain site-plan durations further.
- In March/April 2018 Fairfield Commons requested (and the commission granted) an extension of both the special permit and the coastal site plan to April 8, 2023; International Investors appealed the commission’s extension.
- The Superior Court sustained the appeal in part, holding the commission lacked authority to extend the special permit, but also concluded (erroneously, per this court) that the recorded special permit was valid indefinitely and thus had not expired; International Investors obtained certification to appeal.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a zoning authority may impose a temporal condition on a special permit (e.g., require completion within a set time). | § 8-2(a) authorizes zoning commissions to impose conditions necessary to protect health, safety, convenience and property values, including temporal conditions. | Because legislature set explicit time limits in other land-use statutes, § 8-2(a) should not be read to authorize temporal limits on special permits absent express statutory language. | Court held § 8-2(a) authorizes a zoning authority to impose temporal conditions on special permits (e.g., completion deadlines). |
| Whether a special permit recorded under § 8-3d "runs with the land" and therefore cannot be subject to temporal limits or expiration. | Trial court erred: "runs with the land" means permits are not personal to the applicant, but does not preclude temporal conditions. | Recorded special permit is effective indefinitely and no statute permits revocation or time-limiting once recorded. | Court held the trial court misapplied "runs with the land": a recorded special permit may be temporally limited; here the special permit expired April 8, 2011 for failure to complete development or timely seek extensions. |
| Whether site-plan statutes (§ 8-3(i)/(m)) or the 2011 regulation amendment operated to extend the special permit. | Special permits and site plans are distinct; § 8-3(i)/(m) governs site plans only and cannot extend a special permit. | The 2011 amendment and § 8-3(m) incorporated statutory extensions and could be applied to extend approvals. | Court left intact the Superior Court’s conclusion that the site-plan statutes govern site plans (not special permits) and do not justify extending the special permit; the commission’s extension of the special permit was improper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fromer v. Two Hundred Post Associates, 32 Conn. App. 799 (Conn. App. 1993) (permits run with the land—change of ownership does not void them)
- Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 24 Conn. App. 5 (Conn. App. 1991) (zoning regulations cannot bar valid preexisting nonconforming uses)
- Center Shops of East Granby, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 253 Conn. 183 (Conn. 2000) (distinguishes site-plan ministerial review and special-permit discretionary review)
- Clifford v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 434 (Conn. 2006) (no statutory public-hearing requirement for site-plan applications)
- St. Joseph’s High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. App. 570 (Conn. App. 2017) (explains purpose and regulatory nature of special permits)
- Moscowitz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 16 Conn. App. 303 (Conn. App. 1988) (municipal/zoning agencies have only statutory authority; must identify statutory basis for action)
- Petrucelli v. Meriden, 198 Conn. App. 838 (Conn. App. 2020) (statutory construction principles used by the court)