Interest of Nelson
2017 ND 28
| N.D. | 2017Background
- Danny Nelson was convicted in 2009 of continuous sexual abuse of his step-daughter and served a prison term; while incarcerated he completed low- and high-intensity sex-offender treatment programs.
- The State filed a petition (Dec. 2, 2014) to civilly commit Nelson as a "sexually dangerous individual." A probable-cause order was entered and Nelson was evaluated by two experts: Dr. Krance (State) and Dr. Riedel (independent).
- Dr. Krance diagnosed Nelson with unspecified paraphilic disorder, other specified personality disorder (antisocial and narcissistic traits), and alcohol use disorder, and concluded Nelson was sexually dangerous. Dr. Riedel concluded Nelson was not likely to reoffend and had reasonable control of his behavior.
- After a January 6, 2016 commitment hearing and written submissions, the district court found Nelson was a sexually dangerous individual and ordered commitment to the State Hospital (order filed Mar. 8, 2016). Nelson appealed.
- On appeal the key contested legal questions were (1) whether commitment after completion of prison-based treatment violated substantive due process, (2) whether the State proved statutory elements of sexual dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) whether the district court made the specific factual findings required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 52 and federal due process (including present serious difficulty controlling behavior).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Nelson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does civil commitment after prison treatment violate substantive due process? | Completion of in-prison treatment does not bar commitment if statutory and constitutional standards are met. | Committing Nelson after he completed sex-offender treatment while incarcerated violates substantive due process. | Rejected Nelson’s due process challenge; prior treatment is only one factor and does not preclude commitment. |
| Did the State prove Nelson is a sexually dangerous individual? | The State relied on conviction, Dr. Krance’s diagnosis and testimony to show statutory elements. | Nelson argued the State failed to prove likelihood of future sexually predatory conduct and serious difficulty controlling behavior. | Court could not affirm because district court’s findings were insufficient to permit review. |
| Did the district court make required specific findings on likelihood to reoffend? | District court found Nelson sexually dangerous but relied on preferring Dr. Krance’s testimony. | Nelson argued the order lacked specific factual findings linking his disorder to future dangerousness. | Error: the order lacked specific findings on whether Nelson is likely to engage in further sexually predatory conduct. |
| Did the district court make required findings on present serious difficulty controlling behavior? | Court referenced past conduct and favored State expert. | Nelson contended the court made no present-focused findings showing serious difficulty controlling behavior. | Error: the court made no specific findings on present serious difficulty controlling behavior; remanded for specific findings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Matter of Midgett, 766 N.W.2d 717 (N.D. 2009) (district court must make specific findings on present difficulty controlling behavior)
- Matter of A.M., 787 N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 2010) (standard of review and deference to district court credibility determinations)
- Matter of Wolff, 796 N.W.2d 644 (N.D. 2011) (substantive due process requires proof of serious difficulty controlling behavior as nexus between disorder and dangerousness)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (U.S. 2002) (civil commitment requires proof of serious difficulty controlling behavior to distinguish from typical recidivist)
- Interest of Johnson, 861 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 2015) (district court must state facts supporting finding of serious difficulty controlling behavior)
- Interest of Johnson, 876 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 2016) (analysis of present inability to control behavior is required for continued commitment)
- Interest of Thill, 872 N.W.2d 617 (N.D. 2015) (N.D.R.Civ.P. 52 requires specific factual findings and separate conclusions of law)