Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
135 S. Ct. 513
| SCOTUS | 2014Background
- Integrity Staffing supplied hourly warehouse workers to Amazon; employees retrieved and packaged products.
- Employer required mandatory postshift security screenings (remove personal items, metal detectors) before leaving the warehouse.
- Plaintiffs (Busk & Castro) sued under the FLSA seeking pay for ~25 minutes per shift spent waiting for and undergoing the screenings; alleged screenings benefited employer (theft prevention) and could be reduced to de minimis time.
- District Court dismissed: screenings were postliminary and not "integral and indispensable" to principal activities; Ninth Circuit reversed, treating employer-required, employer-benefiting postshift activities as compensable if necessary to the principal work.
- Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding the screening time noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether postshift security screenings are "principal activities" under Portal-to-Portal | Screenings were necessary to warehouse work and done for employer's benefit (theft prevention), so compensable | Screenings are postliminary/egress procedures distinct from the productive work employees were hired to do | Not principal activities; screenings are postliminary and thus not compensable |
| Whether screenings are "integral and indispensable" to principal activities | Screenings are required and linked to productive work, thus indispensable | An activity is integral/indispensable only if intrinsic to the productive task such that the task cannot be performed without it | Not integral/indispensable: employees could perform duties without screenings; they are not intrinsic to retrieving/packaging goods |
| Whether employer requirement or employer benefit alone makes an activity compensable | Employer mandate and employer benefit render activity compensable under FLSA | Requirement/benefit alone is insufficient; test focuses on relationship to productive work, not mere employer insistence | Rejected Ninth Circuit: requirement/benefit alone is too broad and contrary to Portal-to-Portal Act |
| Whether the possibility of reducing screening time to de minimis changes compensability | Time could be reduced to de minimis; thus should be compensable until reduced | Potential for reduction does not change the nature of the activity or its statutory classification; bargaining issue | Court: reducibility to de minimis irrelevant to FLSA compensability; addressable by employers/employees, not by FLSA claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (broad pre-Portal definition of "work")
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (time on employer premises held compensable under expansive pre-Portal approach)
- Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (activities "integral and indispensable" to principal work are compensable)
- Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260 (sharpening knives compensable as indispensable to meatpacking work)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (Portal-to-Portal interpretation: not all required activities are compensable; clarifies integral/indispensable test)
- Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (deference principles to agency interpretations invoked in concurrence)