195 Vt. 218
Vt.2013Background
- Inman is an inmate serving a 26-month to 8-year sentence who participated in the DOC’s Incarcerative Domestic Abuse Treatment Program (InDAP), a program that can support early supervised release after completing program requirements.
- Inman began InDAP in December 2010 and anticipated possible conditional release after meeting minimum sentence and program requirements (including ~104 group meetings / one year).
- After a December 22, 2011 telephone family-court hearing, a DOC caseworker reported that Inman repeatedly asked the complainant (his wife) to be quiet and accused her of lying; Inman disputes that characterization.
- Inman was placed on 90-day probation in InDAP on January 17, 2012 (including suspension of phone privileges), then terminated from InDAP on January 23, 2012 for reasons including minimization/justification of abuse and contacting the victim while on probation.
- Inman sought administrative review within DOC without success and then sought judicial review in superior court under V.R.C.P. 75 (asserting certiorari or mandamus). The superior court dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, relying on Rheaume v. Pallito.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOC’s termination from InDAP is judicially reviewable under V.R.C.P. 75 via mandamus | Inman: termination is reviewable by mandamus because it is not a discretionary programming decision but a termination; alternatively it was an "extreme abuse of discretion" (factually erroneous) | State: DOC programming/termination decisions fall within DOC discretion and are not subject to Rule 75 review; Rheaume controls | Held: Not reviewable by mandamus; termination is a discretionary programming decision under Rheaume |
| Whether certiorari review applies because the DOC acted quasi-judicially | Inman: termination was quasi-judicial/disciplinary so certiorari should apply | State: DOC is not an inferior tribunal and programming decisions are not quasi-judicial | Held: Certiorari does not apply; DOC is not a quasi-judicial body for program decisions |
| Whether mandamus should be available for "extreme abuse of discretion" in programming decisions | Inman: alleged factual errors and wrongful reliance on caseworker report show extreme abuse warranting mandamus | State: Mandamus applies only where a clear legal duty exists; DOC programming is discretionary | Held: Even assuming an "extreme" standard exists, Inman’s claims do not show refusal to perform a clear legal duty; mandamus unavailable |
| Whether Rheaume controls termination decisions that affect potential early release | Inman: Rheaume distinguished because it involved classification/programming, not termination affecting release | State: Termination is simply a programming decision within DOC’s statutory authority and thus Rheaume applies | Held: Rheaume controls; label "termination" does not change that this is a nonreviewable programming decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Rheaume v. Pallito, 190 Vt. 245 (2011) (programming decisions by DOC are within its broad discretion and not subject to mandamus or certiorari review)
- Mason v. Thetford Sch. Bd., 142 Vt. 495 (1983) (no absolute right to judicial review of administrative decisions)
- Nash v. Coxon, 155 Vt. 336 (1990) (prison programming decisions are discretionary and not judicially reviewable)
- Vt. State Emps. Ass'n v. Vt. Criminal Justice Training Council, 167 Vt. 191 (1997) (mandamus may be extended for extreme abuses of discretion refusing clear legal duties)
- Jordan v. State Agency of Transp., 166 Vt. 509 (1997) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional dismissals)