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234 A.3d 1222
Me.
2020
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Background

  • In 1912–1941 Charles A. Donovan subdivided the Nubble Point property and conveyed lots subject to deed restrictions.
  • A 1941 deed (the Hennessy Deed) conveyed Lots 3, 5, and 72 together and imposed restrictions: (a) Lot 5: no building; (b) Lot 3: only a new one-family house (with price and setback conditions) and a private garage; (c) Lot 72: “A private garage, for use with . . . Lot Number Three (3),” with setback limits and a clause that it "shall not be used for dwelling purposes of any kind."
  • Olivia Doyon (trustee) eventually retained Lot 72 and in 2013 conveyed Lots 3 and 5, separating ownership for the first time since the restrictions were created.
  • In 2014 Doyon sued for a declaratory judgment seeking to build a single-family home and garage on Lot 72; the trial court found restriction c ambiguous and ruled for Doyon.
  • The neighboring lot owners (the Fantinis) appealed; the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed deed interpretation de novo.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Doyon) Defendant's Argument (Fantinis) Held
1) Construction of restriction c: whether Lot 72 is limited to a non-dwelling garage for use with Lot 3 or may be used for a dwelling/other structures Restriction is ambiguous; apply rule favoring less restrictive use and allow house + garage Restriction unambiguously limits Lot 72 to a private garage for use with Lot 3, subject to the stated setbacks and no dwelling Court held the deed is unambiguous: Lot 72 may be used only for a garage for Lot 3 (with setbacks); vacated prior judgment and remanded for entry consistent with this interpretation
2) Standing and enforceability: whether Fantinis may enforce the restriction and whether equitable defenses bar enforcement Fantinis lack standing; alternatively enforcement is inequitable due to changed circumstances or restraint on alienation Fantinis have standing as title descends from land Donovan retained; equitable defenses fail Court agreed Fantinis have standing and rejected the equitable arguments (did not reach them further after deciding deed unambiguous)

Key Cases Cited

  • River Dale Ass’n v. Bloss, 901 A.2d 809 (Me. 2006) (deed construction is a question of law; plain meaning controls unless ambiguous)
  • Sleeper v. Loring, 83 A.3d 769 (Me. 2013) (instrument must be read as a whole; referenced plan is part of the deed)
  • Kinney v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 403 A.2d 346 (Me. 1979) (context of the whole instrument informs deed construction)
  • Matteson v. Batchelder, 32 A.3d 1059 (Me. 2011) (ambiguities resolved in favor of less restrictive uses absent extrinsic evidence)
  • Boehner v. Briggs, 528 A.2d 451 (Me. 1987) (same rule of construction favoring less restrictive interpretation)
  • Herrick v. Marshall, 66 Me. 435 (Me. 1877) (standing to enforce restrictions can derive from retained land title)
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Case Details

Case Name: Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust v. Joseph J. Fantini
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: May 28, 2020
Citations: 234 A.3d 1222; 2020 ME 77
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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