Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren
505 S.W.3d 555
Tex.2016Background
- Ineos USA owned a petrochemical plant; Elmgren was a boilermaker employed by contractor Zachry and was injured by a gas explosion while replacing a valve.
- Ineos employees and Zachry workers had performed lockout-tagout and a "sniff test" before Elmgren began work; gas later exploded from the line Elmgren was working on.
- Elmgren and his wife sued Ineos and Ineos employee Jonathan Pavlovsky alleging negligence, premises-liability, and related theories; defendants moved for summary judgment invoking Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Ineos and Pavlovsky; the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, treating non‑premises negligence claims as outside Chapter 95 and concluding Chapter 95 did not protect Pavlovsky.
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review to resolve (1) whether Chapter 95 covers non‑premises negligence claims, (2) whether it protects a property‑owner’s employee/agent, and (3) whether plaintiffs’ evidence raised fact issues to avoid Chapter 95 protection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chapter 95 applies only to premises‑liability or to all negligence claims arising from condition or use of an improvement | Elmgrens: Chapter 95 is limited to premises‑liability and does not cover negligent activity/undertaking claims | Ineos: Chapter 95 applies to any negligence claim "arising from the condition or use" of an improvement | Court: Chapter 95 applies to all negligence claims arising from the condition or use of an improvement (following Abutahoun) |
| Whether Chapter 95 protects a property‑owner’s employee/agent (Pavlovsky) | Elmgrens: Chapter 95 does not extend to employees; they sued Pavlovsky individually | Pavlovsky: Statute applies to owner’s employees/agents, especially managerial ones; otherwise respondeat superior would defeat Chapter 95 | Court: Chapter 95 protects only the property owner (including vicarious liability against owner) and does not extend to employees or agents |
| Whether plaintiffs produced evidence that the injury arose from a different improvement than the one worked on ("same improvement" requirement) | Elmgrens: Furnaces/valves were separate improvements; gas originated ~200 ft away, creating fact issue | Ineos: Plant’s furnaces/headers were a single integrated improvement; statute requires same improvement | Court: The processing system was one improvement; no fact issue—Chapter 95 applies |
| Whether plaintiffs produced evidence of owner’s "actual knowledge" of the dangerous condition | Elmgrens: Plantwide evidence (safety procedures, prior explosion, post‑accident policy changes) showed knowledge of explosive condition | Ineos: No evidence they knew gas was in the specific line at the time (lockout/tagout and sniff test showed no gas) | Court: Actual knowledge must be of the specific dangerous condition (gas in the line worked on); plaintiffs failed to raise fact issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Abutahoun v. Dow Chemical Co., 463 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2015) (Chapter 95 applies to negligence claims arising from condition or use of an improvement)
- DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1995) ("condition or use" distinction: condition = premises, use = activities)
- Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985) (owner liability where owner exercises control over subcontractor’s work)
- Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1996) (principle that employees generally do not owe a duty to provide safe workplace to co‑workers in certain contexts)
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. 2007) (respondeat superior vicarious liability for employee negligence)