114 N.E.3d 479
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- Plaintiff Charlene Noel (Lawrence County resident) sued multiple defendants for medical malpractice arising from events at IU Health Bedford Hospital (Lawrence County).
- Two defendant corporate entities (IU Health SIP and IU Health Bedford) listed a registered agent with an Indianapolis (Marion County) address.
- Noel filed in Marion County, invoking Trial Rule 75(A)(4)’s preferred-venue provision for the county of a defendant organization’s “principal office.”
- Defendants moved to transfer venue to Lawrence County, relying on I.C. § 23-0.5-4-12 (effective Jan. 1, 2018), which states that a registered agent’s address does not determine venue.
- Noel relied on Indiana Supreme Court precedent (American Family) interpreting “principal office” to mean the corporation’s registered office/agent location, arguing the statute conflicts with T.R. 75 and is therefore void.
- The trial court denied the motion to transfer; the court of appeals affirmed, holding the 2018 statute conflicts with T.R. 75(A)(4) as interpreted by the Supreme Court and is therefore a nullity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Marion County qualify as a preferred venue under T.R. 75(A)(4) ("principal office")? | "Principal office" means the county of the registered agent/registered office; Marion County is preferred because registered agent is in Indianapolis. | The 2018 statute (I.C. § 23-0.5-4-12) removes registered-agent address as a basis for venue; Marion is not preferred. | The court held American Family's interpretation controls: "principal office" equates to registered-office/agent location for T.R. 75(A)(4), so the statute is a nullity to the extent it conflicts. |
| Does I.C. § 23-0.5-4-12 supersede or invalidate T.R. 75(A)(4) as interpreted by American Family? | Statute conflicts with the rule; because rules control procedure, the statute is void; T.R. 75 governs. | Statute is reconcilable with T.R. 75(A)(4) and reflects legislative modernization; it does not fix a more stringent venue rule and should be effective. | The court held the statute conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of T.R. 75(A)(4) and therefore has no force as to venue determination. |
| Whether American Family’s definition of "principal office" applies to domestic corporations too | American Family's holding already covers domestic and foreign corporations. | Defendants argued American Family was tied to foreign-corporation law and should not control domestic corporations. | The court rejected defendants’ limitation and applied American Family to both domestic and foreign corporations. |
| Proper forum for challenging venue-policy concerns created by commercial registered agents | Not applicable (Noel relied on precedent). | Defendants urged legislative fix; argued changes in corporate practice warrant statute. | Court held policy concerns must be addressed to the Supreme Court Rules committee or the Supreme Court itself, not by judicially overruling precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- American Family Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. 2006) (interpreting "principal office" in T.R. 75(A) to mean the corporation's registered office/agent location)
- CTB, Inc. v. Tunis, 95 N.E.3d 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (applied American Family to determine principal office by registered-office/agent location)
- Morrison v. Vasquez, 107 N.E.3d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (concluded I.C. § 23-0.5-4-12 did not override Trial Rule 75(A)(4))
- Augustine v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Gary, 384 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. 1979) (procedural rules and cases decided by the Supreme Court take precedence over conflicting statutes)