Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive (Slip Opinion)
142 Ohio St. 3d 125
| Ohio | 2014Background
- Old Rockside Road (vacated as a county road in 1967) and its bridge cross the boundary between Independence and Valley View; the bridge provides the sole motor-vehicle access to businesses and the Cuyahoga Valley Scenic Railroad Rockside Station.
- Independence asked Cuyahoga County commissioners (2010) to declare the road/bridge a public road of "general and public utility" so the county would be responsible for bridge repairs under R.C. 5591.02/5591.21.
- The county commissioners resolved the road was not of general and public utility; Independence appealed under R.C. 2506.01.
- The common pleas court reversed the commissioners as arbitrary/unreasonable and held the county responsible for bridge repair; the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports that Old Rockside Road is an improved road of general and public utility, making the county responsible under R.C. 5591.02/5591.21.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Independence) | Defendant's Argument (County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Old Rockside Road is an "improved road of general and public utility" under R.C. 5591.02/5591.21 | Road and bridge serve nonlocal traffic and critical public access (businesses, park, railroad); evidence shows substantial usage, so county must repair the bridge | Since the county vacated the road in 1967 and the road primarily serves a limited/local set of businesses and is a dead-end, it is not a road of general and public utility | Affirmed: Court held that the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports that Old Rockside Road is an improved road of general and public utility, obligating the county to repair the bridge |
| Whether commissioners’ factual determination is reviewable by courts in an R.C. 2506.01 appeal | Commissioners’ factual designation may be reversed if not supported by substantial reliable evidence | The characterization is a factual determination and should be upheld where supported by record and historical vacation | Held that trial court properly reversed commissioners because record evidence supported Independence; appellate review limited to whether trial abused discretion |
| Applicability of judicial estoppel to bar Independence from claiming county responsibility because Independence applied for grant funding | Independence’s grant application did not constitute a prior judicial position and was not part of the record; no inconsistent judicial position was taken | County argued Independence’s funding application admitted municipal responsibility and should estop its contrary claim | Rejected: estoppel inapplicable—no prior judicially-accepted inconsistent position in the record and issue raised too late |
| Whether the bridge/road being a dead-end or serving an enclave precludes county duty | Dead-end status or serving few businesses does not automatically make traffic primarily local; must be decided case-by-case | Dead-end roads and isolated business enclaves are typically local; thus county duty should not extend | Rejected in this case: evidence (traffic counts; large numbers of railroad passengers and business-related travel) supported general/public utility despite dead-end status |
Key Cases Cited
- Piqua v. Geist, 59 Ohio St. 163 (Ohio 1898) (county bridge-duty statutes extend to improved roads in common public use)
- Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Cincinnati, 94 Ohio St. 269 (Ohio 1916) (county bridge duty may survive annexation; statutory obligation not necessarily displaced by municipal boundaries)
- Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142 (Ohio 2000) (standards for R.C. 2506 administrative appeals and law-vs.-fact distinctions)
- Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St.2d 202 (Ohio 1979) (trial court’s role in weighing the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in administrative appeals)
- Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30 (Ohio 1984) (appellate review under R.C. 2506 is limited to questions of law and abuse-of-discretion review)
- Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 (Ohio 2007) (elements and limits of judicial estoppel)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (U.S. 2001) (judicial estoppel is equitable and discretionary; considers whether a party persuaded a court to accept an earlier position)
