592 S.W.3d 334
Mo.2019Background
- Incline Village is a subdivision whose developer dammed a creek to create a man-made body of water called Main Lake; the lakebed is owned by the Incline Village trustees and the trustees maintain the lake through annual assessments paid by Incline Village lot owners.
- The Incline Village indenture grants all Incline Village lot owners the right to the "exclusive use and benefit" of Main Lake but restricts dock construction to lots that actually abut the lake and requires trustee approval for docks.
- Sumac Ridge is a neighboring subdivision; deeds for Sumac Ridge lots (including the lot later bought by the Edlers) expressly excluded transfer of any interest in Main Lake.
- Matthew and Andrea Edler own a Sumac Ridge lot that abuts Main Lake and, without trustee approval and after at least one trustee told them they could not build, constructed a floating dock extending from their Sumac Ridge lot onto Main Lake.
- Trustees sued for declaratory relief, trespass, removal of the dock, and fees; the trial court ordered removal of the dock and awarded $70,000 in attorney’s fees to the trustees; the Edlers appealed the fee award and argued they had riparian rights under a "permanent becomes natural" theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Trustees) | Defendant's Argument (Edlers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ownership of land abutting Main Lake (an artificial lake) conveys riparian rights to the Edlers | Abutting landowners do not automatically get riparian rights in an artificial lake; trustees own lakebed and assessments and restrictions control use | Edlers: an artificial lake that is permanent should be treated like a natural lake, giving riparian rights to abutting owners | Held: No riparian rights arose from Edlers’ Sumac Ridge ownership because Main Lake is artificial and the Edlers have no easement or ownership of the lakebed; the dock must be removed |
| Whether an implied or other easement exists permitting the Edlers’ dock | Trustees: no easement in deeds or indenture applies to Sumac Ridge lot; trustee approval is required for docks | Edlers: rely on precedent (Greisinger) and argued permanence/implied rights might create an easement-like right | Held: No easement (express, implied, prescriptive, or by estoppel) was established by the Edlers; prior Missouri law (and the deeds excluding the lake) do not support an easement here |
| Whether Missouri recognizes a "permanent becomes natural" exception that converts an artificial lake into a natural-water regime for riparian rights | Trustees: Missouri law distinguishes artificial and natural bodies; riparian rights for artificial lakes arise only by grant/easement/prescription | Edlers: permanence of the lake and long-term use should convert its legal treatment to that of a natural lake | Held: Court refused to adopt a general "permanent becomes natural" exception; Greisinger does not create that rule and, even under such theories, the Edlers would not qualify |
| Whether trial court properly awarded attorney’s fees as "special circumstances" under Mo. law in declaratory actions | Trustees: intentional trespass and building after being told not to do so are special circumstances warranting fees | Edlers: their position had arguable legal basis and they relied on counsel; conduct was not shown to be in bad faith or frivolous | Held: Fee award reversed — court found no showing of bad faith, frivolousness, or other "special circumstances" sufficient to authorize attorney’s fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964) (distinguishes riparian rights for artificial watercourses from natural ones)
- Bradley v. County of Jackson, 347 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1961) (riparian rights arise from ownership of abutting upland, absent contrary reservation)
- Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 9 S.W.2d 978 (Mo. 1928) (recognized implied reciprocal easements after severance of a single parcel that had used an artificial lake)
- David Ranken, Jr. Technical Institute v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. banc 1991) (American Rule on attorney’s fees; fees require statutory/contractual basis or narrow exceptions)
- Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. banc 2013) (declinature of attorney’s fees absent "special circumstances"; advocacy of a position is not itself a special circumstance)
- Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607 (Mo. App. 2009) (example of "special circumstances" where litigation was groundless and initiated for improper purposes)