In the Matter of the Estate of Slavin, 492 Mass. 551

Patricia Slavin was murdered on May 10, 2016; her daughter Kathleen filed a statement of voluntary administration under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-1201 on August 5, 2016, and the register certified it, making Kathleen the voluntary personal representative.
Kathleen later questioned whether a § 3-1201 voluntary personal representative had authority to pursue wrongful death claims and filed a petition for formal appointment under G. L. c. 190B, § 3-402 on September 25, 2020 (more than three years after death).
Her formal petition asserted that it was timely under the § 3-108 exception for "an estate in which there has been a prior appointment;" the decedent’s other children assented and waived notice.
A Probate judge dismissed the petition as untimely, relying in part on a court practice guide stating voluntary administration is not an "official appointment."
The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review and reversed: it held that a voluntary personal representative under § 3-1201 is a "prior appointment" within § 3-108, so the § 3-402 petition was timely and the dismissal was reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a § 3-1201 voluntary personal representative is a "prior appointment" under § 3-108, allowing appointment proceedings after three years	§ 3-1201 designates a voluntary personal representative, permits a certificate of appointment, confers broad administrative duties and liabilities similar to a court-appointed PR, so it counts as a prior appointment	A voluntary PR is limited and not an "official appointment" by court or magistrate; § 3-108's exception contemplates court or magistrate appointments	Held: Yes. § 3-1201 appointment qualifies as a "prior appointment" for § 3-108 exception; reversal and remand.
Whether treating § 3-1201 appointments as "prior appointments" is consistent with § 3-108's purpose and MUPC flexibility	Allowing conversion/augmentation of authority preserves the purpose of the time limit (will determination and commencement of administration) and advances MUPC's flexibility and efficiency for small estates	Treating voluntary appointments as prior appointments would permit tardy proceedings and potentially undermine time limits	Held: Court found consistency; the purpose of § 3-108 is satisfied where voluntary administration has begun, and MUPC policy favors flexibility.

Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600 (statutory interpretation requires starting with plain language)
Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684 (use common meaning when statute omits definition)
Commonwealth v. Morasse, 446 Mass. 113 (deriving usual meanings from ordinary legal sources)
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773 (interpret undefined statutory words by common usage when appropriate)
Marco v. Green, 415 Mass. 732 (prior case holding a voluntary administratrix under predecessor statute lacked authority to bring/settle wrongful death claim)
Lockwood v. Adamson, 409 Mass. 325 (construe sections consistently with adjacent provisions)
Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407 (avoid treating statutory words as surplusage)
Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710 (court will not add language the Legislature omitted)