IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ANN GRISCHUK (P-250777-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-3890-18

Decedent Ann Grischuk executed a 2015 will that increased a specific bequest to her nephew Michael but eliminated his residuary share that appeared in her 2012 will. Michael sued to admit the 2012 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by decedent's sister Olga.
Four-day bench trial heard testimony from Michael, other relatives, the attorney who drafted the 2015 will, decedent’s physician, caregiver, and bank employee. The 2015 will had been prepared and executed in decedent’s home with the drafting attorney present.
Trial court found decedent had testamentary capacity when she signed the 2015 will and rejected Michael’s undue-influence claim, noting competent medical and attorney testimony and that decedent directed the will’s terms.
Trial court dismissed Michael’s complaint with prejudice. Michael then sought attorney’s fees under Rule 4:42-9(a)(3); Olga sought sanctions under Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(a).
Trial court awarded Michael partial fees and costs ($84,030 fees; $5,350.91 costs), limiting recovery to pretrial/discovery work; denied Olga’s sanctions motion. On appeal the Appellate Division affirmed the merits and the partial fee award and upheld denial of sanctions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Testamentary capacity	Michael: decedent was anxious, depressed, frail and lacked capacity when she executed the 2015 will	Olga: medical records, physician and drafting-attorney testimony show decedent was competent; presumption of capacity and burden on Michael	Affirmed — trial court’s finding of capacity supported by competent credible evidence
Undue influence	Michael: Olga had a confidential relationship and suspicious circumstances (joint account, will changes) indicating undue influence	Olga: no evidence she dominated or coerced decedent; attorney testimony shows decedent directed and understood will	Affirmed — confidential relationship existed but suspicious circumstances were rebutted; no undue influence proven
Attorney’s fees (R. 4:42-9(a)(3))	Michael: had reasonable cause to contest and was entitled to the full fees sought	Olga: claims were meritless; fees should be denied in full	Affirmed in part — appellate court upheld limited fee award (about 42% of requested fees; costs largely through discovery), finding the trial court did not abuse discretion and that pretrial limitation was reasonable
Sanctions (R. 1:4-8 / N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(a))	Michael: (opposes sanctions) claims had a good-faith basis	Olga: suit was frivolous and filed in bad faith; sanctions warranted	Affirmed denial — complaint was not frivolous; reasonable cause existed at least through discovery and the limited fee award addressed post-discovery conduct

In re Livingston's Will, 5 N.J. 65 (1950) (test for testamentary capacity)
Haynes v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 N.J. 163 (1981) (presumption of testamentary capacity)
In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275 (2008) (undue-influence burden and confidential-relationship framework)
In re Estate of Folcher, 224 N.J. 496 (2016) (definition and standard for undue influence)
In re Caruso, 18 N.J. 26 (1955) (reasonable cause to justify inquiry into testamentary sufficiency)
Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1 (2004) (lodestar and fee reasonableness principles)
Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009) (lodestar calculation guidance)
Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001) (appellate review of fee determinations)
Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1986) (need for trial court findings supporting fee awards)
United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2009) (definition of frivolous pleading for sanctions)