in the Matter of the Estate of Michael Shannon Clark II
02-20-00211-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 15, 2021Background
- Amy R. Clark was appointed dependent administrator and, as surviving spouse, applied for a family allowance; the court granted an order on June 21, 2019 awarding $90,000 from sale proceeds of specified real property and $40,379 cash as part of the allowance.
- Clark filed for sale of the referenced real property; sale closed for $460,000 with net proceeds ≈ $342,000, leaving estate proceeds substantially higher than the allowance components in the June 21 order.
- The county court entered a sale-confirmation decree directing proceeds to Clark, then later altered the decree to place proceeds in the court registry and, on April 3, 2020, signed an order vacating the June 21, 2019 family-allowance order (reciting only that a hearing would be held to set the amount).
- The clerk’s record contains no notice or hearing documents showing Clark was given advance notice that the court would consider vacating the allowance order; Clark was later removed as dependent administrator.
- Clark appealed, arguing (1) the county court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the allowance because the order was final and unappealed, (2) the court violated due process by vacating the allowance without notice or an opportunity to be heard, and (3) the court had no statutory authority to vacate the allowance sua sponte.
- The Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) sustained Clark’s due-process (notice) claim, reversed the April 3, 2020 vacating order, and remanded for further proceedings; the court did not resolve the jurisdictional or statutory-authority issues and directed that Clark be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on those questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Clark) | Defendant's Argument (Heirs/Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the county court had jurisdiction to vacate the family-allowance order | The June 21 allowance order was final/appealable and, after the appeal period elapsed, the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate it | The court retained authority to reconsider/enforce probate orders given subsequent events | Not decided on appeal; remanded for county court to consider after giving Clark notice and a hearing |
| Whether vacating the family-allowance order without notice violated due process | The court sua sponte vacated Clark’s allowance months after it granted her property rights, without notice or opportunity to be heard | Implicit position: court acted within its authority; record presumed to show proper procedure | Held for Clark: county court violated due process by not giving notice and opportunity to be heard; April 3, 2020 vacating order reversed and case remanded |
| Whether the county court had statutory authority to vacate the allowance on its own motion | The Estates Code and probate practice do not permit a court to rescind a family-allowance order on its own motion without procedural safeguards | Court/Heirs contend the court has authority to act given circumstances | Not decided; remanded for determination after notice and hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., 485 U.S. 80 (1988) (failure to give notice violates rudimentary due process)
- Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (notice is fundamental to due process)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due-process inquiry: meaningful time and manner to be heard)
- Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995) (Texas due-process standards require meaningful hearing)
- Highsmith v. Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d 771 (Tex. 2019) (explaining the centrality of notice to due process)
- Mosley v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2019) (Texas follows federal due-process precedent)
- Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1983) (in probate, notice must be reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings affecting protected interests)
- De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2006) (framework for determining finality of probate orders)