99 N.E.3d 634
Ind.2018Background
- Gary Kent executed a will leaving most of his estate equally to daughter Cynthia (Cindy) and son John David (David). In December 2015, at Gary’s request while terminally ill, Cindy and David signed a written "Settlement Agreement" dividing specified real and personal property; Gary indicated it conformed to his wishes.
- About a week later David sent Cindy a written notice purporting to rescind the Agreement. Gary died in January 2016.
- Personal Representatives (David and Kevin Kent) petitioned to probate Gary’s will and did not reference the Agreement; Cindy challenged probate and moved to enforce the Agreement as a codicil or under Indiana Code chapter 29-1-9 (the Compromise Chapter).
- The trial court held the Agreement was not a codicil and did not fall under the Compromise Chapter because it was executed before Gary’s death; it also found David rescinded the Agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Compromise Chapter did not clearly prohibit pre-mortem compromises and that David’s rescission was ineffective.
- The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and held the Compromise Chapter applies only to post-mortem compromises; the Court affirmed the trial court except it vacated the trial court’s finding that David validly rescinded the Agreement and remanded for further proceedings on rescission/contract issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cindy) | Defendant's Argument (Personal Representatives/David) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Compromise Chapter (I.C. ch. 29-1-9) can be used to enforce a family settlement executed before the decedent’s death | The statute does not clearly and unambiguously forbid pre-mortem compromises; public policy favors family settlements and freedom of contract, so the chapter can apply pre-mortem | The chapter’s text and purpose refer to a "decedent," "estate," probate and administration—terms that exist only post-mortem—so the chapter applies only after death | Held: The Compromise Chapter applies only post-mortem; Cindy may not use it to enforce the pre-mortem Agreement |
| Whether the Agreement is enforceable as a codicil to the will | The Agreement conforms to Gary’s wishes and functions as a codicil | The Agreement is not executed as a codicil and the legislature’s probate scheme controls testamentary modifications | Held: Trial court’s conclusion that it is not a codicil was affirmed (Court did not find it to be a codicil) |
| Whether David validly rescinded the Agreement before Gary’s death | David’s rescission notice terminated the Agreement | David must show a legal basis for unilateral rescission; mere notice is insufficient without supporting evidence | Held: The appellate record is insufficient to determine rescission; trial court’s rescission finding vacated and remanded for further factual development |
| Whether the Agreement is enforceable under general contract law (outside the Compromise Chapter) | Cindy suggested enforceability but limited her appellate request to the Compromise Chapter | Personal Representatives contested enforceability; trial record was undeveloped on general contract claims | Held: Court declined to decide enforceability under general contract law now and left that issue to further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Kent v. Kerr (In re Supervised Estate of Kent), 82 N.E.3d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (Court of Appeals opinion holding Compromise Chapter does not clearly prohibit pre-mortem family settlement agreements)
- In re Estate of Garwood, 400 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 1980) (refusing to enforce purported family settlement under statute where requirements were not met)
- Yeley v. Purdom (In re Supervised Estate of Yeley), 959 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (post-mortem settlement reviewed under the Compromise Chapter)
- Gabriel v. Windsor, Inc., 843 N.E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing standards for unilateral rescission of contracts)
- Shuee v. Shuee, 100 Ind. 477 (Ind. 1885) (early recognition of family settlement practiced post-mortem)
- Cornet v. Guedelhoefer, 36 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. 1941) (analyzing agreements settling will contests entered after death)