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IN THE MATTER OF THE INCOME TAX PROTEST OF HARE
398 P.3d 317
Okla.
2017
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Background

  • Bill Hare, Jr. was a 2% shareholder of two Oklahoma S-corporations (Briggett, Inc. and Briggett Transportation, Inc.) that sold substantially all assets (including goodwill) in September 2007.
  • Hare reported his distributive share of sale proceeds as long-term capital gain on his 2007 federal return and later filed an amended Oklahoma return to claim the Oklahoma net capital gain deduction under 68 O.S. § 2358(F).
  • The Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) denied the deduction to the extent attributable to intangible personal property (goodwill), allowing only a partial refund; Hare protested and sought the full deduction.
  • Administrative proceedings and cross-motions for summary disposition produced no disputed facts; the ALJ and OTC denied Hare the deduction for goodwill.
  • The Supreme Court reviewed statutory interpretation of § 2358(F), focusing on whether proceeds from a pass-through entity’s asset sale (including goodwill) constitute proceeds from the sale of a "direct or indirect ownership interest" qualifying for the deduction.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Hare's distributive gain from sale of S-corporations' assets (including goodwill) qualifies as gain from the "sale of a direct or indirect ownership interest in an Oklahoma company" under 68 O.S. § 2358(F)(2)(a)(2) Hare: Sale of substantially all corporate assets by an S-corp is the functional sale of an indirect ownership interest in an Oklahoma company; therefore the capital gain deduction applies OTC: The statute only covered sale of real property, tangible personal property, stock, or equity interests; intangible personal property (goodwill) from an asset sale did not qualify Court: The sale of pass-through entity assets (including goodwill) by S-cos constitutes the sale of an indirect ownership interest and qualifies for the § 2358(F) deduction
Whether the 2007 amendment to § 2358(F) should be applied retroactively or viewed as clarification of original intent (supporting Hare) Hare: 2007 amendments merely clarified original law and confirm that intangible assets sold as part of "substantially all assets" were intended to qualify; retroactive effect appropriate OTC: 2007 amendments cannot be applied retroactively to 2007 transactions; original statute did not cover intangibles in asset sales Court: Even without retroactivity, legislative amendment confirms original interpretation and demonstrates legislature intended to allow deduction for asset sales (including intangibles); supports Hare's position
Whether statutory terms "direct" and "indirect" ownership interest limit the deduction to equity sales only Hare: "Direct" covers equity/stock sales; "indirect" covers pass-through entity asset sales — statute therefore encompasses both structures OTC: Treated the phrase as not applying to intangibles in asset sales, effectively limiting deduction to stock/equity sales Court: Definitions in § 2358(F) make clear "indirect" means ownership via pass-through entity that sells assets; the statute contemplates asset sales by pass-throughs as qualifying indirect ownership interest
Whether denying deduction when business sold via asset sale (versus equity sale) produces irrational disparate treatment Hare: No rational basis to allow deduction for a stock sale that is effectively a sale of goodwill but deny it for an asset sale of the same goodwill OTC: Argued statutory scope excluded intangible asset sales Court: Treating identical economic results differently based on form is irrational; statute read to avoid such disparity and allow deduction for asset sales by pass-through entities

Key Cases Cited

  • Am. Airlines, Inc. v. State, ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 341 P.3d 56 (Okla. 2014) (standards for reviewing OTC adjudications and de novo statutory interpretation)
  • CDR Sys. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 339 P.3d 848 (Okla. 2014) (context on legislative purpose of the capital gain deduction)
  • Russell v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 212 P.3d 1178 (Okla. 2009) (statutory construction principle: ascertain legislative intent)
  • Fanning v. Brown, 85 P.3d 841 (Okla. 2004) (use plain meaning of statutory words unless otherwise indicated)
  • Lumber 2, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 261 P.3d 1143 (Okla. 2011) (give undefined statutory terms their ordinary meaning)
  • Globe Life & Acc. Insur. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 913 P.2d 1322 (Okla. 1996) (every statutory word must be given effect)
  • Sunray Oil Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 134 P.2d 995 (Okla. 1943) (classification of stock as intangible property)
  • Patterson v. C.I.R., 810 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1987) (business goodwill is a capital asset under the Internal Revenue Code)
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Case Details

Case Name: IN THE MATTER OF THE INCOME TAX PROTEST OF HARE
Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Date Published: Jun 27, 2017
Citation: 398 P.3d 317
Court Abbreviation: Okla.