in the Matter of the Marriage of Stephanie Gwinn Armstrong and Ronald Dean Armstrong
12-15-00300-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 31, 2017Background
- Ronald and Stephanie Armstrong married in 1993 and later divorced after both filed petitions alleging cruelty and adultery and seeking disproportionate community-property shares.
- The trial court awarded Ronald the business entity Warehouse Hardware Enterprises, LLC (including inventory, receivables, cash) as his separate property.
- The trial court awarded Stephanie “The Warehouse real estate and the Watkins interest contiguous thereto” as her separate property, described in an exhibit.
- Evidence showed Ronald and Dotie Adams (Stephanie’s mother) purchased the Warehouse Property on Sept. 27, 2010; Dotie paid the $30,000 purchase price and both names appear on the general warranty deed.
- Trial testimony and inventories indicated Ronald and Stephanie each claimed a one-half interest in the Warehouse Property; there was no documentary evidence that Ronald deeded the Warehouse Property to his LLC or that a partnership existed between Ronald and Dotie.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by awarding the Warehouse real estate to Stephanie | Stephanie argued the property was part of the marital estate and the court could divide it | Ronald argued the Warehouse Property belonged to his LLC or was held in a partnership with Dotie and thus not divisible community property | Court held the Warehouse Property was part of the marital estate (each spouse one-half); no evidence it was deeded to the LLC or that a partnership existed; modified decree to award Stephanie only the marital estate’s one-half interest |
Key Cases Cited
- Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005) (standard for abuse of discretion in property division)
- Garza v. Garza, 217 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006) (supporting evidence required for property-division review)
- Henry v. Henry, 48 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001) (reversal only when error materially affects just-and-right division)
- Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004) (reversible error requires remand of entire community estate division)
- Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985) (principle on remand for new division when necessary)
- Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (presumption and burden rules for community vs. separate property)
- Ben Fitzgerald Realty Co. v. Muller, 846 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993) (partnership existence primarily a fact question)
- Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009) (consideration of partnership factors under totality of circumstances)
- Mullins v. Mullins, 202 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (appellate court may modify judgment when information is available)
