in the Matter of the Marriage of Thomas Eugene Vick and Diana Lynn Vick and in the Interest of M.A v. and L.L v. Children
07-15-00019-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 3, 2016Background
- Diana Vick (wife) and Thomas Vick (husband) married 1981; separated May 2010; husband filed for divorce August 2010. Temporary orders gave husband custody of two minor daughters and required wife to make temporary child-support payments and vacate the family home.
- Two-day bench trial held December 2011; property division was later referred to a special master after the court made no final property-division ruling at trial.
- Special master filed recommendations in May–August 2013; no record of the master’s hearings exists in the appellate record. Final decree of divorce entered September 26, 2014; the trial court modified the decree twice during plenary jurisdiction.
- Wife, appearing pro se on appeal, raised issues about annuity valuation, geographic restriction on the children’s residence, a claimed child-support credit, the monthly child-support amount, denial of a de novo trial after the master, and denial of new trial.
- Court of Appeals affirmed the decree except it reversed and remanded limitedly to correct the child-support amount because the decree fixed wife’s monthly support at $1,091.71 without evidentiary support.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Vick) | Defendant's Argument (Vick) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Valuation date for Variflex annuity | Trial court used special-master valuation date (May 16, 2013) rather than date of divorce; error and prejudicial | Court relied on master’s recommendation; wife failed to show prejudice or how value difference altered division | Overruled — no reversible abuse shown; wife failed to show harm |
| Geographic restriction on child’s residence | Trial court should have imposed a geographic restriction (or expressly state "without regard to geographic location") | Decree gave husband exclusive right to designate primary residence and omitted restriction; court’s order effectively allowed relocation | Overruled — no abuse shown; wife didn’t show best-interest basis for restriction |
| Child-support credit ($10,800) | Parties agreed or special master recommended $10,800 credit; decree omitted explicit credit | Record ambiguous; decree may have effectuated credit via property division but did not explicitly state it | Overruled — record does not show abuse of discretion |
| Amount of child support ($1,091.71) | Wife contends decree fixes $1,091.71 without evidentiary support; she presented evidence supporting $806.70 monthly | Court found parties agreed to $1,091.71 (court’s finding contested); other evidence could support different amounts | Sustained — court abused discretion by setting $1,091.71 without evidentiary support; remanded for recalculation |
| Right to trial de novo after special master | Wife argues she was entitled to de novo trial on objections to master’s recommendations | Master was appointed by agreement (not Rule 171); court’s order authorized a recommendation; no preserved complaint about appointment; no record what additional evidence wife would have offered | Overruled — no reversible error in denying de novo trial or in adopting master’s division |
| Denial of new trial (best interest of children) | Wife argues changed circumstances and that court failed to consider children’s best interest; sought new trial | Motion for new trial lacked the best-interest argument on appeal and later motions; appellate record contains no admissible extra-record evidence | Overruled — issue not preserved and appellate court cannot consider out-of-record facts |
Key Cases Cited
- McCain v. McCain, 980 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 1998) (no pet.) (appellate review of family law orders requires showing of clear abuse of discretion)
- McLane v. McLane, 263 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) (pet. denied) (abuse-of-discretion test: arbitrary, unreasonable, or without guiding principles)
- Brejon v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (no pet.) (some evidence of probative character suffices to avoid reversal)
- Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1993) (writ denied) (standards for sufficiency of evidence supporting trial court’s family-law findings)
- Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998) (no abuse where trial court bases decision on conflicting evidence)
- Rafferty v. Finstad, 903 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995) (writ denied) (property division must be "just and right")
- Cook v. Cook, 679 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 1984) (no writ) (to reverse valuation error appellant must show overall division manifestly unjust)
- Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (standard for appellate reversal of child-support orders)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2012) (a trial court abuses discretion by ruling without supporting evidence)
- Simpson v. Canales, 806 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (consent to appointment of master generally waives challenge to referral)
