In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.E v. and D.G.V., 141 A.3d 254

Background

In 2009 L.A. placed her daughter with the Children’s Home Society (CHS); after initial consideration of surrender, she later objected to adoption and submitted three written objections.
CHS notified L.A. in March 2013 that it planned to pursue adoption and enclosed consent/surrender forms; the letter stated she had a right to counsel but was equivocal about appointment of counsel.
Petitioners J.E.V. and D.G.V. filed a private adoption complaint in August 2013; the summons/notice informed L.A. she could be appointed counsel if indigent, but the trial court did not explicitly tell her a lawyer would be appointed.
A two‑day bench trial in Feb–Mar 2014 proceeded with petitioners represented and L.A. pro se; the court terminated L.A.’s parental rights based on clear‑and‑convincing evidence and entered adoption.
The Appellate Division appointed counsel on appeal, reversed, and held indigent parents in contested private adoptions have a right to appointed counsel once they object; the Supreme Court granted certification.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Appellate Division: under the State Constitution’s due process guarantee, indigent parents facing termination in contested private adoption proceedings are entitled to appointed counsel; appointment is triggered when the parent formally objects; L.A. did not knowingly waive counsel, so reversal and remand for a new trial was required.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether indigent parents facing termination in contested private adoption proceedings are entitled to appointed counsel	L.A.: due process under NJ Constitution requires appointed counsel in contested private adoption cases; federal law is not dispositive	Petitioners: no statutory or constitutional right to appointed counsel in private adoptions initiated by private parties	Held: Yes — Article I, ¶1 (due process) of NJ Constitution entitles indigent parents to appointed counsel in contested private adoption termination proceedings
When the right to appointed counsel is triggered	L.A.: counsel must be appointed before trial once agency decides to pursue adoption over parent’s objection	Petitioners: timing not established; appointment unnecessary because private action differs from state‑initiated proceedings	Held: Triggered when parent formally objects to agency’s decision to proceed (or when petition is filed and parent objects in non‑agency cases)
Whether L.A. waived right to counsel	L.A.: could not knowingly waive a right that was not clearly established; notices were ambiguous and court did not ensure she understood appointment availability	Petitioners: L.A. had written notices and failed to request counsel, so she waived the right	Held: No waiver — notices were equivocal, no meaningful colloquy occurred; denial of counsel warranted reversal
Whether children in private adoptions must be represented by law guardian	Amici: due process/equal protection require appointment of law guardian for children in private adoption cases	Petitioners: (argued against mandatory appointment)	Held: Court declines to order mandatory law guardian appointment; Adoption Act does not authorize routine law guardian appointment but trial courts may appoint guardian ad litem; invites Legislature to consider statutory change

Key Cases Cited

Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (federal Mathews balancing in parental‑termination counsel claims; case‑by‑case approach)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three‑factor due process balancing test)
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 (2007) (NJ recognition that counsel is needed in parental termination cases under State due process principles)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence required before state may terminate parental rights)
Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281 (1971) (consequence‑of‑magnitude approach supporting appointment of counsel in serious civil proceedings)
Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127 (2006) (NJ constitutional right to counsel in child‑support enforcement when incarceration risk exists; discussion of Mathews factors and legislative funding)