In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of D.Y. Svp 491-08, 218 N.J. 359

Background

D.Y., previously convicted of sexual offenses against minors (state and federal convictions), completed his sentence in 2008 and the State filed for involuntary civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA).
At initial proceedings D.Y. sought to represent himself; the trial court ordered psychiatric competency evaluation and later denied his request to proceed pro se at the final commitment hearing, finding statutory requirement that counsel be present controlled.
The trial court committed D.Y. after a final hearing he did not attend; the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of self-representation, holding no federal constitutional right (Faretta Sixth Amendment or Mathews due process) applied in SVPA proceedings.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification limited to whether a constitutional right to self-representation exists at SVPA commitment hearings and solicited supplemental briefing on the proper due-process framework and state-constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division, holding that under the SVPA statutory text a competent individual may proceed pro se only if standby counsel is present and available; remanded for a new hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a competent SVPA respondent has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation	D.Y.: Faretta applies because SVPA proceedings significantly curtail liberty, so Sixth Amendment self-rep right should extend	State: Faretta is limited to criminal prosecutions; no Sixth Amendment right in civil SVPA commitments	Court avoided Sixth Amendment analysis and resolved case statutorily; did not recognize a Sixth Amendment right here
Whether due process (Mathews) or Fourteenth Amendment requires a right to self-representation in SVPA hearings	D.Y.: Mathews balancing supports self-rep — high private liberty interest, low burden on State, and standby counsel available	State: Mathews does not mandate self-rep; public safety and orderly administration weigh against it	Court did not reach Mathews balancing because statutory construction made constitutional ruling unnecessary
Whether SVPA statutory provisions bar self-representation	D.Y.: The statute should not be read to prohibit competent respondents from speaking for themselves	State: Statutory language requiring counsel present and prohibiting appearance without counsel bars pro se participation	Held: N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c) and 30:4-27.31(a) permit two alternatives — full counsel or competent self-representation with standby counsel present and available
What procedural safeguards apply if a competent respondent seeks to proceed pro se under the SVPA	D.Y.: Courts can allow self-rep with safeguards (competency, standby counsel)	State: Emphasizes need for counsel to protect fairness and public safety; court control over disruptions	Held: Court must ensure waiver is knowing, intelligent, voluntary (analogous to Crisafi inquiry); standby counsel may advise, expedite, and assume representation if necessary; court may terminate pro se status for obstruction or incompetence

Key Cases Cited

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognition of Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in criminal prosecutions)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due-process balancing framework for deciding procedural protections)
McKaskel v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (authority recognizing appointment/use of standby counsel in self-representation settings)
State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499 (1992) (prescribed court inquiry to ensure self-representation waiver is knowing and intelligent)
In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109 (2002) (explaining SVPA proof requirements and role of psychiatric evidence)
In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152 (2014) (describing SVPA elements and clear-and-convincing standard)
State v. Davenport, 177 N.J. 288 (2003) (discussing standby counsel and trial court authority to manage pro se defendants)