In the Matter of the Estate of: George W. Stanford, a/k/a George William Stanford, Andrew J. Johnson v. The State of Wyoming, 448 P.3d 861

Background:

Andrew Johnson's 1989 convictions were vacated in 2013; in 2017 he sued the City of Cheyenne and several officers alleging civil rights violations, naming deceased detective George W. Stanford (d. 2007).
Johnson petitioned the probate court to admit Stanford's intestate estate and to appoint an administrator, listing potential estate assets including state indemnification and insurance coverage; the court initially appointed an administrator in June 2017.
Johnson filed a creditor's claim against Stanford's estate for potential damages from his federal case; the administrator rejected the claim.
The State of Wyoming filed objections to the administrator's appointment, asserting it was "affected" because the appointment could create state duties and indemnification obligations and requested waiver of filing deadlines.
The probate court vacated the administrator's appointment, ruling the State had standing to object (citing Wyo. Stat. § 2-1-103), waived the deadline, and found the creditor claim speculative and untimely.
Johnson appealed; the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed standing de novo and reversed, holding the State lacked statutory standing to contest appointment under the probate code.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State had standing to object to appointment of an administrator for Stanford's estate	Johnson: State lacks statutory standing under the probate code (only persons entitled to act as administrator or otherwise ‘‘interested’’ per § 2-4-206 may contest)	State: It is "affected" by appointment because appointment may create state duties/indemnification obligations; invoked § 2-1-103 timing rule and Declaratory Judgment Act	Held: State lacked statutory standing under the probate code to contest the appointment; probate court erred in entertaining the objection
Whether the State could use the Declaratory Judgment Act to contest the appointment	Johnson: DJA cannot be used to circumvent specific probate statutory scheme limiting who may contest	State: DJA permits resolution of its rights and obligations arising from appointment	Held: DJA not available to bypass probate-code limitations; allowing it would subvert legislative design
Whether the probate court properly relied on timing statute and ruled on the merits (creditor claim timeliness / improvident appointment)	Johnson: Even if late, substantive issues (creditor claim untimely/speculative) should be evaluated only by proper parties	State: Sought waiver of time limits and urged court to vacate appointment	Held: Court did not reach substantive validity or timeliness on appeal because State lacked standing; reliance on § 2-1-103 was misplaced given § 2-4-206 controls who may contest

Key Cases Cited

Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Gunter, 167 P.3d 645 (Wyo. 2007) (limits who may contest appointment of a personal representative; contestant must have statutory right to act as administrator)
Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1974) (establishes prudential standing factors used in Wyoming)
In re L‑MHB, 431 P.3d 560 (Wyo. 2018) (clarifies statutory vs prudential standing and reviews standing de novo)
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (U.S. 2014) (statutory standing inquiry focuses on whether plaintiff is within the class authorized by statute)
Matter of Estate of Britain, 425 P.3d 978 (Wyo. 2018) (Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used to replace or evade a specific statutory procedure)
Allred v. Bebout, 409 P.3d 260 (Wyo. 2018) (reiterates Brimmer prudential standing test)