In the Matter of Terrie Harman and Thomas McCarron, 168 N.H. 372

Terrie Harman and Thomas McCarron were granted an uncontested divorce in New Hampshire in July 2014 on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
In March 2015 the parties jointly petitioned the trial court to vacate the 2014 divorce decree, stating they had reconciled and attaching a signed agreement requesting vacatur of the decree "in full and in all respects."
The trial court denied the petition, concluding it lacked authority under the circumstances to vacate a final divorce decree based solely on reconciliation.
Harman appealed; McCarron declined to file a separate brief. The Supreme Court appointed amicus curiae to defend the trial court’s ruling.
Harman argued courts possess general power to vacate judgments and asked the Court to permit vacatur of a final divorce decree by joint request of reconciled parties; amicus argued divorce jurisdiction is purely statutory and no statute authorizes vacatur for reconciliation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a trial court may vacate a final divorce decree upon joint request by reconciled parties	Harman: Courts generally can vacate judgments; parties’ agreement and reconciliation justify vacatur without showing fraud, mistake, or other defect	Amicus/State: Divorce power is strictly statutory; no statute authorizes vacatur for reconciliation, so court lacks authority absent traditional grounds (fraud, mistake, etc.)	Court: Held no authority to vacate a final divorce decree for reconciliation absent statutory authorization or grounds like fraud or mistake

Veino v. Veino, 96 N.H. 439 (N.H. 1951) (divorce jurisdiction is statutory and must be strictly construed)
Walker v. Walker, 119 N.H. 551 (N.H. 1979) (court authority in marriage and divorce matters is strictly statutory)
Daine v. Daine, 157 N.H. 426 (N.H. 2008) (court has only such power in divorce field as granted by statute)
Adams v. Adams, 51 N.H. 388 (N.H. 1872) (general proposition that courts may set aside judgments for good cause, and divorce may be vacated for fraud, accident, mistake, or misfortune)
In re Marriage of Schauberger, 624 N.E.2d 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (statutory rule permitting vacatur of final divorce within a defined period)
Wells v. Roberson, 209 So. 2d 919 (Miss. 1968) (statute allowed revocation of divorce upon joint application and satisfactory evidence of reconciliation)
Darby v. Darby, 370 N.W.2d 205 (S.D. 1985) (in absence of statute, court cannot vacate divorce decree solely for reconciliation)
Meyer v. Meyer, 99 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. 1951) (court lacked jurisdiction to vacate final decree long after entry where statute rendered decree final)