In the Matter of Registrant A.D.
119 A.3d 241
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2015Background
- Appellants are Megan’s Law registrants whose termination requests were denied by the Law Division.
- N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f allows termination if the registrant has not committed an offense within 15 years and is not likely to threaten public safety.
- “Offense” is defined by the Code as crime, disorderly offense, or petty disorderly offense unless the code indicates otherwise.
- Appellants’ intervening offenses (non-sex offenses) occurred within the 15-year window, triggering denial.
- A.D. argued the term should be read to mean “sex offense,” while J.B. and C.M. relied on other subsections and legislative history; the trial court and Appellate Division disagreed.
- Court conducted a de novo statutory interpretation to resolve the meaning of “offense” for termination under Megan’s Law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What does ‘offense’ mean in 2C:7-2f? | A.D. argues it means sex offense. | State (and J.B./C.M.) argues it means general offense as defined by Code. | Offense means crime, disorderly offense, or petty offense as defined by the Code. |
| Should extrinsic aids or legislative history govern the interpretation? | A.D. seeks committee statements to redefine offense. | Court should not resort to extrinsic aids where plain language unambiguous. | Extrinsic aids not required; Legislature defined offense and plain language controls. |
| Is J.G. controlling precedent on the meaning of offense for termination? | J.G. supports reading offense as sex offense. | J.G. does not mandate that interpretation for general termination; dicta. | J.G. is not binding or dispositive on the general meaning of offense for 2C:7-2f. |
| Is the termination provision rationally related to Megan’s Law goals if ‘offense’ includes non-sex offenses? | Including non-sex offenses aligns with public safety goals and risk assessment. | Legislature chose offense as defined; non-sex offenses are not clearly within the scope. | Interpreting offense to include non-sex offenses is rationally related to public safety. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) (Megan’s Law constitutional; termination based on offense-free period)
- In re Registrant L.E., 366 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 2003) (context on termination and Jacob Wetterling Act background)
- J.G., 169 N.J. 304 (2001) (juvenile sex-offender termination discussion; dicta on offense term)
- State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014) (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
- State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576 (2014) (guidance on interpreting statutory language)