In the Matter of Patricia Sweatt and Arthur Sweatt, 173 A.3d 1080

Background

Patricia and Arthur Sweatt married in 1978; Patricia filed for divorce in April 2015 citing irreconcilable differences.
A bifurcated divorce decree dissolving the marriage was entered July 31, 2015, leaving property division for a later final hearing; no appeal or post-decision relief was filed from that decree.
Patricia died September 24, 2015; her daughter Kathleen Paine sought appointment as administrator of the estate and later moved to be substituted as a party in the divorce proceeding.
The probate appointment of Paine was delayed; the trial court allowed substitution on March 3, 2016 and held the final hearing the same day.
The trial court found respondent noncompliant with certain rules, received supplementary financial disclosure at the hearing, and on April 1, 2016 issued a final order dividing marital property equally and denying abatement and other relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Paine/Administrator)	Defendant's Argument (Sweatt)	Held
Whether the divorce action abated on Patricia’s death	Abatement does not apply because the marriage was dissolved by the bifurcated divorce decree entered before death	The divorce abated on death; the bifurcated decree was not a final order because property division remained unresolved	Court: No abatement — bifurcated decree was a final decision on dissolution and was not subject to abatement once entered
Whether Paine could be substituted as administrator for Patricia after death	Substitution appropriate; Paine was actively seeking probate appointment and substitution caused no prejudice	Substitution improper because Paine filed before appointment and was delayed five months, prejudicing respondent	Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing substitution; no prejudicial error shown
Whether the court violated RSA 458:16-a, II by dividing property more than six months after divorce and by distributing to the estate	Division between parties (including estate standing in decedent’s shoes) is authorized; statute imposes no time limit	Division untimely under statute and estate is effectively a creditor so property sale/distribution to estate is improper	Court: No statutory time limit in RSA 458:16-a, II; estate stands in decedent’s position — distribution to estate permissible
Due process/equal protection and procedural compliance claims	Paine complied after appointment; substitution/remedial procedures were proper and not prejudicial	Paine had no obligation pre-appointment, impairing discovery and equal treatment; court treated respondent as noncompliant but not Paine	Court: No violation shown — respondent failed to demonstrate prejudice or cite controlling authority; procedural rulings sustained

Key Cases Cited

Mortner & Mortner, 168 N.H. 424 (N.H. 2015) (divorce action abates on death unless a final divorce decree issued before death)
Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82 (N.H. 1993) (a bifurcated divorce decree issuing dissolution is a decision on the merits and appealable)
In the Matter of Beal & Beal, 153 N.H. 349 (N.H. 2006) (trial court not authorized to order sale of property to satisfy creditors when statute limits distribution to parties)
In the Matter of Harman & McCarron, 168 N.H. 372 (N.H. 2015) (courts lack certain powers in divorce matters absent statutory authorization)
Giles v. Giles, 136 N.H. 540 (N.H. 1992) (reversible error requires prejudice to the complaining party)