In the Matter of Nicholas Kelly and Astrid Fernandes-Prabhu, 164 A.3d 379

Background

Parents of a three-year-old had a January 2015 final parenting plan giving mother sole decision-making and primary residential responsibility; father had regular weekend and evening parenting time.
The father obtained a later modification extending weeknight parenting time; not at issue on appeal.
In September 2015 the father sought at least 50% parenting time and joint decision-making; the mother sought additional alternating-weekend overnights for herself. The court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) after finding insufficient reliable evidence to modify then.
In March 2016 the trial court modified the plan: it awarded the father joint decision-making and "a nearly equal schedule" of parenting time, citing the parties’ agreement the plan was not working.
Mother moved for reconsideration arguing the court lacked statutory authority under RSA 461-A:11; the motion was denied and she appealed. The Supreme Court reviewed preservation and the substantive statutory issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Kelly)	Defendant's Argument (Fernandes‑Prabhu)	Held
Whether trial court had authority to modify parenting schedule under RSA 461‑A:11,I(a)	"Agree to a modification" means parties both agreeing that the plan should change (no need to agree on specific terms)	Parties must agree to specific modification terms; mere mutual desire for change is not an ‘‘agreement’’	Rejected Kelly’s reading; I(a) requires agreement on specific terms, so court could not rely on I(a) to modify schedule
Whether modification could be sustained under RSA 461‑A:11,I(c) (clear and convincing detrimental environment)	Prior orders, GAL appointment, and court observations establish detrimental environment justifying modification	Record lacks specific findings showing clear and convincing proof that child’s environment was detrimental and that benefits outweigh harm	Court will not infer I(c) findings; record insufficient to uphold modification under I(c); modification of schedule reversed/vacated and remanded
Whether award of joint decision‑making was proper under RSA 461‑A:11,II (best interest)	Joint decision‑making is in the child’s best interest given father’s strong relationship	Mother contests that evidence favored keeping sole decision‑making	Modification of decision‑making vacated for lack of detailed findings; trial court may reassess on remand if not based on improper parenting‑time change
Who bears burden when seeking to modify decision‑making under RSA 461‑A:11	Cross‑reference to RSA 461‑A:5,III means presumption of joint decision‑making applies and relieves mover of burden	RSA 461‑A:11,III expressly places burden on the moving party; RSA 461‑A:5 presumption applies to original orders, not modifications	Moving party bears burden on modification; no presumption of joint decision‑making in modification context

Key Cases Cited

Thorndike v. Thorndike, 154 N.H. 443 (discusses preservation of issues for appeal)
Mortgage Specialists v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764 (explains giving trial court opportunity to correct errors; preservation doctrine)
Dukette v. Brazas, 166 N.H. 252 (appellant must show arguments were raised below to preserve them)
In the Matter of Muchmore & Jaycox, 159 N.H. 470 (standard of review for parenting‑plan modifications)
In the Matter of Choy & Choy, 154 N.H. 707 (importance of specific findings when modifying parenting plans)
In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 166 N.H. 422 (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
In re Guardianship of Williams, 159 N.H. 318 (courts should avoid statutory constructions that render provisions redundant)
In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for trial court)
Smith v. Lillian V. Donahue Trust, 157 N.H. 502 (assumption that trial court made subsidiary findings necessary to support its decision)
412 S. Broadway Realty v. Wolters, 169 N.H. 304 (addressing judicial economy and consideration of issues that may arise on remand)