In the Matter of Jeffrey Allen Chapman
419 S.C. 172
| S.C. | 2017Background
- Jeffrey Chapman, with multiple prior sexual-offense convictions including a 2005 lewd-act-on-a-minor plea, was tried under South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act); a jury found him an SVP and the trial court ordered civil commitment.
- The State’s expert (Dr. Gehle) diagnosed paraphilic disorder (biastophilia), antisocial personality disorder, and substance abuse disorder and opined high risk to reoffend; defense expert disputed some diagnoses and the risk assessment (Static-99R).
- Chapman’s trial counsel made virtually no objections and filed no post-trial motions; Chapman raised ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal.
- The central legal question was whether persons committed as SVPs have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and, if so, how and when those claims may be raised and evaluated.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina held SVP commitments implicate due process and that the statutory right to counsel under section 44-48-90 is constitutional and necessarily includes a right to effective counsel; ineffective-assistance claims must generally be pursued by habeas corpus, with appointment of counsel for the first habeas proceeding.
- Because Chapman’s ineffective-assistance claims were unpreserved at trial, the court affirmed the commitment but allowed Chapman to reassert those claims in a future habeas proceeding under the Strickland standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chapman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| I. Does an SVP have a due-process right to effective counsel? | SVP statutory right to counsel implies a constitutional right to effective assistance. | The Act provides a statutory right to counsel only; no special constitutional dimension. | Yes. The statutory right under §44-48-90 is also a constitutional due-process right and includes a right to effective assistance. |
| II. When may ineffective-assistance claims be raised? | Chapman urged the claims be entertained on direct appeal because no statutory collateral procedure exists. | Such claims are cognizable via common-law habeas corpus; direct appeal is not the proper forum. | Claims should be raised in habeas proceedings (after direct appeal/exhaustion); habeas is the appropriate avenue here. |
| III. What standard governs ineffective-assistance claims in SVP cases? | A different (more lenient) standard should apply since commitments are civil. | Use the familiar Strickland two-prong standard applied in many civil-commitment contexts. | Apply the Strickland standard (deficient performance + prejudice) to SVP ineffective-assistance claims. |
| IV. Did trial counsel’s failures violate Chapman’s right? | Counsel’s omissions deprived Chapman of effective assistance. | Failures were unpreserved; record inadequate to resolve on direct appeal. | Chapman’s claims are unpreserved; commitment affirmed. He may reassert ineffective-assistance claims in habeas proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due process)
- Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (prisoners facing involuntary civil commitment must be afforded procedural protections, including independent assistance)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- In re Care & Treatment of McCoy, 360 S.C. 425 (2004) (recognized statutory counsel right under the Act; modified to acknowledge constitutional dimension)
- Ontiberos v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 10 (2012) (287 P.3d 855) (applies due-process analysis and recognizes constitutional right to counsel and effective assistance in SVP commitments)