In the Matter of Glenda J. Ball and Frank A. Ball, 168 N.H. 133

Background

Frank A. Ball (respondent) and Glenda J. Ball (petitioner) divorced in Massachusetts; their 2005 separation agreement (incorporated in the MA decree) required child support until "emancipation" and continued support to age 23 for full‑time college students domiciled with and dependent on a parent.
The family moved from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008; the MA decree was registered in NH and the parties submitted a 2008 partial stipulation striking the MA definition of "emancipation" and agreeing that New Hampshire law would govern duration; the NH court approved and set weekly support.
In 2013 the respondent sought termination of support for the parties’ eldest child, who was 18 and had graduated high school; the petitioner argued the MA decree still required support because the child was in college and dependent.
The NH family division (trial court) denied the respondent’s motion, relying on UIFSA and concluding it lacked authority to shorten the duration set under the MA order; respondent appealed.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded UIFSA applied, analyzed Articles 6 and 7 jurisdictional provisions, and addressed whether the 2008 NH modification was jurisdictionally valid and whether any error was jurisdictional or waived.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding the NH court had subject‑matter jurisdiction in 2008 under UIFSA §613 (RSA 546‑B:51) and that any error in applying NH law to duration was not a jurisdictional defect and had been waived by the petitioner.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Glenda)	Defendant's Argument (Frank)	Held
Whether NH court had subject‑matter jurisdiction in 2008 to modify the MA order’s duration	Trial court lacked jurisdiction because NH could not modify aspects non‑modifiable under MA law (duration)	NH had jurisdiction under UIFSA §613 because all individual parties resided in NH and the child did not reside in MA	NH had subject‑matter jurisdiction under RSA 546‑B:51 (UIFSA §613); court may adjudicate modification requests
Whether RSA 546‑B:49(III) (UIFSA §611(c)) prevented NH from modifying duration	RSA 546‑B:49(III) barred modification of nonmodifiable aspects under issuing state law, so NH could not shorten duration	RSA 546‑B:49(III) concerns choice of law, not subject‑matter jurisdiction; misapplication would be legal error, not voiding jurisdiction	Court held §49(III) governs which substantive law to apply to aspects that are nonmodifiable, but does not strip subject‑matter jurisdiction; applying NH law in 2008 (if error) was non‑jurisdictional and waivable
Whether the 2008 NH order was void for lack of jurisdiction	Petitioner argued 2008 modification was void because it shortened duration contrary to MA law	Respondent argued 2008 order was valid under UIFSA §613 and created NH continuing exclusive jurisdiction	Court held the 2008 order was not void for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction; any error was waived by petitioner
Remedy: Should respondent’s obligation to eldest child be terminated now	Petitioner sought continued enforcement under MA order	Respondent sought termination per the 2008 NH order and current facts (child 18 and graduated)	Court reversed trial court and remanded to extinguish respondent’s obligation as required by the 2008 order (error below reversed)

Key Cases Cited

Scott & Pierce v. Scott, 160 N.H. 354 (N.H. 2010) (UIFSA jurisdiction and effect of a modifying tribunal becoming the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction)
In the Matter of Yaman & Yaman, 167 N.H. 82 (N.H. 2014) (standard of review for UIFSA interpretation)
Hemenway v. Hemenway, 159 N.H. 680 (N.H. 2010) (subject‑matter jurisdiction principles in family division matters)
In the Matter of Muller & Muller, 164 N.H. 512 (N.H. 2013) (limits of family division jurisdiction and statutory grant required)
Hennepin County v. Hill, 777 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (usefulness of uniform‑act drafters’ intent in interpreting uniform laws)
Lunceford v. Lunceford, 204 S.W.3d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (issuing state loses modification nexus when all parties leave)
LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490 (Tenn. 2001) (continuing, exclusive jurisdiction concept under UIFSA)
Wills v. Wills, 745 N.W.2d 924 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (UIFSA’s purpose to avoid conflicting orders)