in the Interest of T.J.H., W.D.H., and L.B.H., Children, 12-15-00062-CV

Background

2010 district-court order named Father sole managing conservator; Mother was possessory conservator and ordered to pay child support.
Father left children with maternal grandparents; grandparents later filed an unpursued motion to modify conservatorship.
In 2014 the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) filed a motion seeking to modify conservatorship and child-support provisions, asserting the children lived with Mother.
The case was referred automatically to a Title IV-D associate judge; Father, incarcerated at the time, requested counsel, a bench warrant, or alternative means (video/phone) to participate but did not appear at the hearing.
The associate judge signed an order naming Mother and Grandparents joint managing conservators and changed support provisions; Father appealed.
The court of appeals reversed on two independent grounds: (1) Title IV-D associate judges lacked authority to modify conservatorship pre-amendment, and (2) the associate judge erred by failing to consider Father’s request to participate remotely. The Supreme Court affirmed only on ground (2) but held that, under the pre-amendment Family Code and federal Title IV-D law, the OAG and Title IV-D associate judges did have authority to seek and decide conservatorship issues when tied to establishment/modification of child support.

Issues

Issue	OAG (Petitioner) Argument	Father (Respondent) Argument	Held
Whether the OAG had authority to seek modification of conservatorship as part of Title IV-D services	Federal Title IV-D authorizes services related to establishment/modification/enforcement of support; Texas statutes incorporate those services—so OAG may seek conservatorship modification when related to child-support actions	OAG lacked statutory authority because the Texas Family Code’s listed IV-D services did not expressly include conservatorship modification	Held: OAG had authority—federal statute and Texas code authorize services related to support, and modifying conservatorship to effectuate support falls within those services
Whether a Title IV-D associate judge had authority to hear and decide a motion to modify conservatorship under the pre-2015/2017 Family Code	Chapter 201 authorizes associate judges to render or recommend any non-final order or orders needed to "complete" a Title IV-D case; subsection lists were not exclusive, so associate judge could decide conservatorship when tied to support	Associate judges lacked authority because statute’s enumerated powers did not explicitly include suits affecting conservatorship; such matters are beyond associate judges’ scope	Held: Associate judge had authority under subchapter B to hear and render orders on conservatorship issues when they relate to establishing/modifying child support
Whether the associate judge’s failure to consider Father’s request to participate remotely required reversal/remand	OAG conceded error on this procedural point and urged affirmance only on authority ground	Father argued he was denied procedural protections by not being allowed to participate or having a warrant/continuance	Held: Reversal and remand affirmed on this independent procedural ground—the associate judge erred by failing to consider Father’s request to participate remotely

Key Cases Cited

Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995) (definition of "action"/"suit" and statutory interpretation principles)
Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) (statutory construction; meaning of "action")
Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. 2001) (government authority limited by statutes; agency act within statutory bounds)