in the Interest of R.H.C., 09-15-00429-CV

Parents divorced in 2010; original decree named both as joint managing conservators and gave Father (S.D.C.) exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence within Walker and Montgomery Counties when the child began school.
In 2014 the court modified that right to allow Father to designate residence within Montgomery and contiguous counties and made provisions for lifting the restriction if Mother (T.D.) did not reside in those counties.
Father moved with the child to Denton County (about 250 miles away) for employment before seeking post-modification relief; Mother filed a counter-petition seeking to be awarded the exclusive right to designate the child’s residence (restricted to Montgomery and contiguous counties).
At trial each side offered conflicting evidence about the child’s welfare after the move: Father testified the move improved finances, school, routine, and family support; Mother testified the child became withdrawn, had hygiene and health concerns, and that logistics impaired her ability to exercise visitation. Mother also said she would change employment obligations if awarded primary residence rights.
The trial court found material and substantial changes in circumstances, denied Father’s petition to lift the restriction, granted Mother’s counter-petition in part, and awarded Mother the exclusive right to designate the child’s residence (restricted to Montgomery County and contiguous counties). Father’s motion for new trial was denied.

Issue	Father (S.D.C.) Argument	Mother (T.D.) Argument	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by changing which parent has exclusive right to designate child’s residence after Father moved outside the geographic restriction	Court based modification solely on Father’s violation of geographic restriction; no statute or precedent allows changing designation right solely because parent relocated	Trial court relied on broader evidence of material/substantial change and best-interest factors, not solely the violation	Court affirmed: modification supported by some substantive/probative evidence and was a reasonable exercise of discretion
Whether modification met statutory standard (material/substantial change + best interest)	Did not contest material/substantial change finding; challenged sufficiency of best-interest evidence	Argued sufficient evidence on best-interest factors to award Mother exclusive designation right	Court held sufficient evidence supported best-interest determination

Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1982) (abuse-of-discretion standard in custody modifications)
Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. 2002) (factors governing relocation and best-interest analysis)
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (Holley factors for child’s best interest)
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) (definition of abuse of discretion)
Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002) (trial court’s advantage in observing witness demeanor in custody matters)
In re M.A.M., 346 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011) (abuse-of-discretion review in modification cases)